INTRODUCTION Ivii 



and fishermen coming from the United States." Great Britain sub- 

 mitted " that they should be desirable on grounds of public order and 

 morals." The United States did not include this heading in its sub- 

 mission, nor did it object to it except as affecting the time and man- 

 ner of fishing. It was a further limitation upon the power of Great 

 Britain, because, however desirable such regulations should be, they 

 were, nevertheless, to be reasonable. Admitting, therefore, that any 

 proposed regulation should be reasonable and appropriate, or necessary 

 for the protection and preservation of the fisheries, desirable on grounds 

 of public order and morals, equitable and fair as between local fish- 

 ermen and the inhabitants of the United States, the United States 

 maintained that imperial or local municipal laws, ordinances, or regula- 

 tions respecting the time and manner of fishing were not binding upon 

 the United States "unless their appropriateness, necessity, reasonable- 

 ness, and fairness be determined by the United States and Great 

 Britain by common accord and the United States concurs in their 

 enforcement." The issue, therefore, was clearly defined. All regula- 

 tions were to be reasonable. The one question involved was whether 

 Great Britain alone could determine the question of reasonableness or 

 whether the reasonableness of fishing regulations should be determined 

 by Great Britain and the United States in common accord. 



Simple as the question seems, it is, nevertheless, very difficult, for 

 what is reasonable to one, especially when special interests are involved, 

 may not be reasonable to the other. Regulations which may be reason- 

 able for a shore fishery might appear unreasonable in the case of fishing 

 from ships. A regulation designed to preserve an advantage given by 

 the use of the shore might operate as a discrimination against a fishery 

 wholly conducted' from fishing vessels. A regulation prohibiting fishing 

 on Sunday might appear reasonable to those residing permanently upon 

 the shore, whereas a prohibition against Sunday fishing might be a hard- 

 ship upon those present upon the coast for but a limited time, for the fish 

 must be caught, if at all, when and as they appear. A prohibition, how- 

 ever general, of the use of certain kinds of nets might discriminate 

 against a vessel fishery profitably employing nets in the prosecution of 

 its industry, whereas fine fishery from the shore might be unaffected, 

 and the result would be a discrimination against the foreigner in favor 

 of the local fishermen. These are but a few examples of the hard- 

 ships and discriminations which may result if the question of the 

 reasonableness of regulation is decided by one party to the treaty in- 

 stead of by common accord. The difficulty may seem, however, more 

 specious than real, because the contention of Great Britain did not 



