Iviii INTRODUCTION 



exclude the United States from the determination of the reasonableness 

 of fishing regulations. The treaty gave the inhabitants of the United 

 States the right to fish, and if a regulation interfered with the fishing 

 right, the United States would naturally possess the right to invoke 

 the treaty and protest against the enforcement of the regulation; but 

 the right of Great Britain to determine the reasonableness in the first 

 instance would cast the burden of proving the unreasonableness upon 

 the United States, and in the meantime American fishermen and 

 American vessels violating the regulation would be subject to the 

 penalties imposed by local law. As the protest would be conveyed 

 through diplomatic channels, American inhabitants would suffer in 

 their persons and property during the determination of the ques- 

 tion, and even if the protest were successful, the payment of indem- 

 nity would be delayed to the detriment of fishing operations which had 

 suffered by the enforcement of the regulations. The interpretation of 

 the Convention of 1818 would thus be obtained at the expense of the 

 American fishermen. The contention of the United States would secure 

 the interpretation of the treaty in advance, and American fishermen 

 visiting the fishing grounds would be taxed with knowledge of the com- 

 mon regulations and violate them, at their peril. It may be main- 

 tained, and it was indeed often said, that there was no ground to 

 suppose that British regulations would be unreasonable and that such 

 a contention impugned the good faith of Great Britain, which regarded 

 itself as bound by its treaty stipulations. But the answer is that 

 nations are unwilling to submit the interpretation of their rights to 

 other nations even when uninfluenced by special interests. The admin- 

 istration of justice is based upon the fundamental proposition that a 

 party should not be judge in his own cause, and in accordance with 

 this maxim it would seem that the reasonableness of proposed legislation 

 should be decided by neither party, but by both, acting in common 

 accord. The tribunal was apparently impressed by considerations of 

 this nature, because, while holding that Great Britain might "make 

 regulations without the consent of the United States" which are (i) 

 appropriate or necessary, (2) desirable or necessary on grounds of 

 public order and morals, and (3) equitable and fair as between local 

 and American fishermen, and that such a right is inherent in the sover- 

 eignty of Great Britain, it nevertheless held, by virtue of the form of 

 the question and by virtue of the admission of British counsel in the 

 trial of the case, that the question of reasonableness if contested 

 should be decided by an impartial authority.' 



' Appendix, p. 502; Oral Argument, p. 1446. 



