INTRODUCTION ciii 



ties of report, entry, and clearance at a custom-house, nor to light, 

 harbour, or other dues not imposed upon Newfoundland fishermen." ^ 

 An examination of the award on this question which has been quoted 

 in full shows that the duty to report is based upon the prerequisite that 

 "proper conveniences for doing so are at hand" and that in such a case 

 the requirement is not imreasonable. In the next place, the Tribunal, 

 true to its conception that the expression "in common" meant equality 

 in the right and in its exercise, held that no regulations should bind 

 American fishermen unless local fishermen were likewise bound, for 

 equality is inconsistent with discrimination. The text of the award is 

 explained by the reasoning of the Tribunal, which precedes it, and would 

 seem to be incorporated in the award itself, because the decision on this 

 point is justified by the Tribunal by "the reasons stated in the foregoing 

 opinion." An examination of the reason which led the Tribunal to its 

 conclusion discloses the fact that it considered the third question 

 under discussion as relating exclusively to fishing, not to commercial 

 operations, and that regulations eminently proper for commercial 

 transactions might be inappropriate to fishing and might, indeed, 

 interfere seriously with its successful exercise. The exact language is 

 brief and to the point. 



"The exercise of these liberties . . . has no reference to any commercial privileges 

 which may or may not attach to such vessels by reason of any supposed authority 

 outside the treaty, which itself confers no commercial privileges. ... It follows, there- 

 fore, that when the inhabitants of the United States are not seeking to exercise the 

 commercial privileges accorded to trading-vessels for the vessels in which they are 

 exercising the granted liberty of fishing, they ought not to be subjected to require- 

 ments as to report and entry at custom-houses that are only appropriate to the exercise 

 of commercial privileges. The exercise of the fishing liberty is distinct from the exer- 

 cise of commercial or trading privileges and it is not competent for Great Britain or 

 her colonies to impose upon the former exactions only appropriate to the latter. The 

 reasons for the requirements enumerated in the case of commercial vessels, have no 

 relation to the case of fishing vessels." ' 



To this clear statement of the distinction between fishing and com- 

 mercial vessels and the necessary difference between regulations affecting 

 each, Kttle can be added. Experience shows, however, that the desire 

 for profit frequently leads to abuse and, therefore, it seems eminently 

 proper that the Government of Newfoundland should be informed of the 

 presence of American fishing vessels in Newfoundland waters, in order to 

 prevent violation of the fishing liberty and to prevent the presence for 

 one purpose being used for another and distinct purpose. 



Therefore the Tribunal very properly was of the opinion that it was 



'^ Appendix, p. $06; Oral Argument, p. 1450. 

 ^Appendix, p. 506; Oral Argument, p. 1450. 



