ARGUMENT OF MR. ROOT 17 



recourse to the fact that under this recent agreement a Tribunal may 

 do what it would have been unjust for Great Britain to do, that is 

 to say, to pass herself alone upon the rights in which another was 

 equally interested, to be the judge in her own case. 



Of course I need not argue that the assekion of such an uncon- 

 trolled right is in its legal effect wholly destructive of the limitation 

 which is stated in the contention of Great Britain under the first 

 question of the special agreement. 



How does Great Britain arrive at the conclusion that, while the 

 grant of 1818 Umits the scope of sovereignty, excludes her from 

 legislation which modifies or affects our right, she alone is entitled 

 to be the judge as to what is desirable, appropriate, necessary, 

 and fair for her purposes to lead to a modification and restriction 

 and limitation of our right ? She does it by appealing to her sov- 

 ereignty. It is not because there is any fairness as between two 

 common owners of a right, that one should be the judge of limita- 

 tions and modifications to be imposed upon the right; she does 

 it by an appeal to her sovereignty. It is because she is sovereign 

 there. 



I shall deal hereafter with the question as to whether there is 

 any foundation for that appeal. I refer to it now, however, for 

 the purpose of pointing to the practical effect of the ground on which 

 she claims the right to decide. That is, the ground upon which she 

 claims that she had the right to decide prior to the making of 

 this special agreement, for the ninety years before the treaty of 

 1908 came into existence. 



What is the practical effect of Great Britain establishing her 

 right to determine alone herself as to what limitations may and 

 should be imposed upon our right, upon the ground of her sov- 

 ereignty? Why, it is that the right granted to us is subject to 

 her right of sovereignty. And what is the scope of the right of 

 sovereignty ? 



It is to do what she pleases. It is that shemay, if she will, go 

 to any length whatever in restricting, limiting, impeding, or prac- 

 tically destroying the right which has been granted, for there is no 

 limitation upon the right of sovereignty, and whatever authority 

 is to be inferred from that is an authority without limit. 



Now, I have endeavored to state what I think to be the attitude 



