ARGUMENT OF MR. ROOT 85 



contending for. And I think that this treaty grant draws clearly 

 the line within which that principle applies; that Great Britain 

 has full and unrestrained scope of sovereignty until she comes to 

 that clear and definite fine, that is, of the exercise of the right of 

 fishing, as granted in the terms of the grant; but when she comes 

 to that narrow field, wishing to change the situation by making a 

 new limitation, that was not in the treaty, a Hmitation upon the 

 times or manner, then that ought to be in practical good sense the 

 subject of consultation between both owners of the common right; 

 and if they cannot agree, let it be determined before it is made 

 effective and our fishermen's vessels are seized under it. My 

 objection to the British theory is that they propose to make these 

 things effective by virtue of their sovereignty, ex propria vigore, 

 before anybody has decided. Sir Robert Finlay says they have 

 not the right to decide; that they do not claim the right to decide; 

 that they ought not to decide — but they propose to make effective 

 these limitations by deciding. 



The President: Your rights, as you consider them, would be 

 safeguarded by conceding to you a suspensive veto? 



Senator Root: Precisely. 



The President: A suspensive veto, until the decision of an 

 impartial Tribunal ? 



Senator Root: Precisely. Before this treaty was made, 

 what we claimed was that instead of going ahead and putting your 

 regulations, extending your sovereignty, over the modification of 

 this right without saying anything to us, you should consult us 

 first, just as you did with Mr. Marcy when these laws were brought 

 down to him and he approved them. And in order to obviate the 

 claim that that might lead to a deadlock and might put Great 

 Britain in a most disagreeable situation, because she has got this 

 colony behind her, pressing always for extreme views and extreme 

 action, we make this agreement, under which, if we cannot agree 

 upon what ought to be put into force, we will go to The Hague 

 Tribunal, and we will have an arrangement, perhaps a more con- 

 venient and practical arrangement, proposed by the Tribunal, for 

 determining whether they ought to be put into effect or not. 



