ARGUMENT OF MR. ROOT 93 



This was to a sovereign. And it follows necessarily, from the 

 nature of sovereignty, that the right was held by the sovereign 

 with the powers of a sovereign. It was its right. It was the right 

 of the United States. There is a perhaps apparent analogy to 

 a trust in form, but it is the trust of sovereignty. It is that great 

 trust under which aU the powers of sovereignty are held, a trust 

 which differs from all mimidpal trusts in that there is no power to 

 supervise or control it. 



My friend the Attorney- General criticised a gentleman who was 

 introduced here by Sir Robert Finlay as a very learned author, 

 Mr. Clauss. Sir Robert was specially solicitous to know that the 

 Tribimal had the book written by Mr. Clauss, and he quoted to 

 the Tribunal not mere statements of fact by Mr. Clauss, but an 

 expression of opinion regarding the construction of instruments 

 ■ which were supposed to create servitudes, as being well worthy the 

 attention of the Tribunal. And he describes Mr. Clauss as a learned 

 author. Now when it appears that in this book, which the Tribunal 

 has, there were statements of fact, of a great range of facts, and 

 expressions of ' opinion which do not smt the British Case, my 

 learned friend the Attorney-General flouts Mr. Clauss, and he 

 rather criticises him for shrinking from giving a definition of sov- 

 ereignty. The Attorney- General goes on to niake a definition of 

 sovereignty, and I am bound to say that when I read his definition 

 I am inclined to think Mr. Clauss was wise, for the Attorney- 

 General's definition is either defective or no definition at all. The 

 definition by the Attorney-General [p. 1033] is: 



"Sovereignty is the supreme governing power vested in some defined 

 person or persons over all persons and things within the Umit or under the 

 control of a state. That is the modem view of «overeignty." 



If that means by the expression "within the limit of a state" 

 within the spatial territorial sphere of the state, it excludes the very 

 important range of sovereignty which is maintained generally on 

 the continent, that is, the control over the person, the subject, the 

 citizen, wherever he goes, and which we certainly do exercise, all 

 of us, all countries in the Western civiHzed world, within the range 

 of extra-territoriality, in the Oriental countries. If the words 

 "within the limit of a state" do not refer to spatial extent, then we 



