94 FISHERIES ARBITRATION AT THE HAGUE 



have no definition, because this amounts merely to sajdng that 

 sovereignty is the power to govern all persons and things within 

 the power of government; and the addition of the words "or under 

 the control of a state" adds nothing to the definition, because it 

 is merely expressing the same idea in different words. 



Now, let me join Sir WilUam in rushing in where Mr. Clauss 

 feared to tread. I do it with more confidence, because there is no 

 counsel to come after me, and I am sure that the Court will be judi- 

 cial in its treatment of the subject. I am going to state what seems 

 to me to be the modern idea of sovereignty, the universal idea, 

 and base it upon the definition of a very great English thinker — 

 I should say, although, of course, it is open to difference of opinion 

 and dispute, the most accurate Enghsh thinker of modern times — 

 and that is John Austin. Basing the definition upon what he 

 says, I should say: " Sovereignty is the power to control, without 

 accountabihty, all persons constituting an organized poKtical com- 

 munity and the territory occupied by them, and all persons and 

 things within that territory." 



The essential quality of the definition, which is Austin's, is the 

 freedom from accountabihty to anyone, and that is the same idea, 

 I suppose, which is carried into the Attorney-General's definition 

 by the word "supreme." That is the characteristic essential 

 quality of the artificial person to which this grant is made, the 

 nation, the United States. And the United States holds this great 

 national right concerning a subject-matter of special interest to all 

 sovereigns imder the powers of sovereignty, which involve no 

 accountability to any power on earth. It follows, necessarily, 

 that this right of the United States, that its inhabitants shall have 

 the Hberty to take fish, is a right which the United States can, so 

 far as it and its inhabitants are concerned, deal with at its will. It 

 can impose upon its inhabitants conditions to the exercise of the 

 liberty that they may have; it may say to them, "You shall 

 exercise that liberty only upon complying with such and such con- 

 ditions." It may exclude part of them from it. It may include 

 part of them in it. It may say, "You shall exercise it only at such 

 times, and not at other times." It may say to them, "You shall 

 exercise it only in such ways, and not in other ways." That is 

 necessarily the result of this national right being granted to this 



