232 FISHERIES ARBITRATION AT THE HAGUE 



that the proprietor could be deemed to be invested with a trust 

 to be exercised impartially and judicially for the benefit of both of 

 the competing classes. 



Now, under this theory of obhgation, as I have said, it is agreed 

 equally, as upon the theory of perpetual right, that the sovereignty 

 of Great Britain is limited; and it remains that there can be no 

 implied reservation of the rightful exercise of the sovereign power 

 of Great Britain within the field covered by the grant, because the 

 very essential purpose of the grant being to limit the rightful 

 exercise of British sovereignty as to that subject-matter, the exer- 

 cise of the sovereignty is excluded just so far as the grant goes, 

 and when the terms of the grant have been read no hmitation can 

 be imposed upon them derived from the existence of the sovereignty, 

 or the nature of the sovereignty, which it was the purpose of the 

 grant to Umit and exclude from rightful exercise. 



In this case of obhgation, as in the case of real right, the terms 

 of the contract control, and those terms cannot, consistently with 

 the contract, be subjected to the exercise of any power not found 

 in the terms of the contract, or of any power which is imported 

 into the contract from the fact of the sovereignty which it was the 

 object of the contract to hmit and exclude. 



In this case, as in the other, the terms of the contract assure to 

 the United States, for its inhabitants, the right, in common with 

 British subjects, to take fish without expressing any Hmitation upon 

 the exercise of that right, without expressing or suggesting any 

 authority in the grantor of the contract right to say that the right 

 shall not be exercised at any time or in any manner which the 

 grantee of the right deems proper to the exercise thereof. 



In this case, as in the other, we are precluded from considering 

 that the grantor nation, which had by the grant excluded itself 

 from the rightful exercise of its sovereignty, within the field covered 

 by the grant, should assume to exercise over the subject-matter of 

 the grant an authority which, in its nature, would make it possible 

 for the grantor practically to destroy the value of the grant. 



In this case, as in the other, we are precluded from considering 

 that it was within the contemplation of the parties that the grantor 

 should continue to exercise an authority in respect of the subject- 

 matter of the grant which, when apphed to the grant in terms 



