238 FISHERIES ARBITRATION AT THE HAGUE 



in terms. We might, looking at the language of a treaty with our 

 knowledge, interpreting the words in the Ught of what we know, 

 come to one conclusion; but our knowledge is necessarily imperfect. 

 We cannot completely put ourselves in the position of the earlier 

 time; and the interpretation which was put upon this treaty at the 

 time when it was made, and for many years succeeding, is the 

 product of a knowledge more complete than ours can possibly be; 

 and the absence of one single word in any document or conversation 

 during all that period which points to the existence of an idea in 

 the minds of the parties that Great Britain was to say what limita- 

 tions there might be, or should be, upon our right is, in the view 

 of this rule presented by the Attorney-General, of the greatest 

 cogency. 



There is another subject to which I must briefly call the attention 

 of the Tribunal. Other nations have granted rights having the 

 same generic quahties and characteristics as the right which we 

 have here under consideration. Other nations have had their 

 questions regarding them, have discussed them, have reached con- 

 clusions, and have fallen into a course of settled practice regarding 

 them. Other publicists, have reasoned about them, have examined 

 them, analyzed them, considered their nature, the legal effect and 

 rules of construction which are to be applied; and the results of 

 these processes have been to give in the international law of the past 

 two centuries a wide field of accepted rules, following upon thorough 

 consideration. We cannot ignore this; but it is not my purpose to 

 weary the Tribunal by going over the subject which was so learnedly 

 and clearly presented by Senator Turner. The Tribunal has the 

 authorities which he presented, the exposition of the international 

 law relating to rights belonging to this class, and I shaU not trouble 

 the members of the Tribunal further with them. Yet I cannot 

 ignore it, because the Tribunal cannot ignore it. A great inter- 

 national Tribunal owes a duty not merely to the parties, but, if 

 we are ever to have a system of international law which justifies 

 the existence of a great Permanent Court, a Tribunal Uke this owes 

 a duty to mankind, a duty to the nations, in reaching such a con- 

 clusion regarding such a matter as is presented here as shall tend 

 not to break down, to disintegrate, but to build up, to perfect, to 

 strengthen a system of settled and accepted rules which shall furnish 



