ARGUMENT OF MR. ROOT 251 



sions had entered into the way of regarding this kind of right on the 

 part of the nations of the earth. 



This particular specific kind of right which these gentlemen call 

 "economic servitudes" has been recognized as constituting a class 

 by itself, so freely, so generally, that I submit the Tribunal cannot 

 ignore the fact that it is a class by itself, and a class which has the 

 incident that I have been contending for. 



I say we produce evidence that the conclusion which we 

 have been urging upon the Tribunal, whether on the basis of 

 real right or on the basis of the limitation created by an obh- 

 gatory stipulation — the conclusions we have been urging upon 

 you, have been reached by substantially all the writers upon 

 International Law, and accepted by the nations of the earth, and 

 constitute a rule of construction to be applied to this treaty, 

 powerfully supporting our reasoning and making it impossible to 

 ignore that, because of the insignificance and incompetency of 

 the men who presented it. 



That these rights which are called "economic servitudes," and 

 which I should prefer to call burdens upon the territory of one state 

 for the benefit of the inhabitants or citizens of another, constitute 

 a class by themselves, appears in the writings which we have 

 presented, and from Vattel, Chretien, Despagnet, Diena, Fabre, 

 Fiore, Hartmann, Heffter, Hollatz, Rivier, UUmann, AVharton, Wolf, 

 Wilson and Tucker, Holtzendorff, Merignhac, Olivart, Oppenheim, 

 and Pradier-Fodere. 



Now, they support us, they have reached the same conclusions 

 we have, and they testify that the nations, whose consent makes 

 international law, have accepted the conclusion, however reached, 

 by whatever process of reasoning, the conclusion that such a right 

 as this is a thing by itself, and, from the necessity of its existence, 

 independent of the kind of control which Great Britain claims to 

 read into this treaty as a matter of implication. 



And I submit that our reasoning cannot be rejected without at 

 the same time rejecting the general opinion of the world of inter- 

 national law. 



I should modify that — it is not our reasoning, but our conclu- 

 sion that cannot be rejected, without rejecting the opinion of the 

 world of international law which has reached that same conclusion, 



