398 APPENDIX 



by the war. It was obvious that the treaty of peace of 1783 was not one of those 

 ordinary treaties which, by the usages of nations, were held to be annulled by a sub- 

 sequent war between the same parties: it was not simply a treaty of peace; it was 

 a treaty of partition between two parts of one nation, agreeing thenceforth to be 

 separated into two distinct sovereignties. The conditions upon which this was done 

 constituted, essentially, the independence of the United States; and the preserva- 

 tion of all the fishing rights, which they had constantly enjoyed over the whole coast 

 of North America, was among the most important of them. This was no concession, 

 no grant, on the part of Great Britain, which could be annulled by a war. There had 

 been, in the same treaty of 1783, a right recognized in British subjects to navigate 

 the Mississippi. This right the British plenipotentiaries at Ghent had considered 

 as still a just claim on the part of Great Britain, notwithstanding the war that had 

 intervened. The American plenipotentiaries, to remove all future discussion upon 

 both points, had offered to agree to an article expressly confirming both the rights. 

 In declining this, an offer had been made on the part of Great Britain of an article 

 stipulating to negotiate in future for the renewal of both the rights, for equivalents, 

 which was declined by the American plenipotentiaries, on the express ground that 

 its effect would have been an implied admission that the rights had been annulled. 

 There was, therefore, no article concerning them in the treaty, and the question as 

 to the right was not discussed. I now stated the ground upon which the Government 

 of the United States considered the right as subsisting and unimpaired. The treaty 

 of 1783 was, in its essential nature, not liable to be annulled by a subsequent war. 

 It acknowledged the United States as a sovereign and independent Power. It would 

 be an absurdity, inconsistent with the acknowledgment itself, to suppose it liable 

 to be forfeited by a war. The whole treaty of Ghent did constantly refer to it as 

 existing and in full force, nor was an intimation given that any further confirmation 

 of it was supposed to be necessary. It would be for the British Government ultimately 

 to determine how far this reasoning was to be admitted as correct. There were, also, 

 considerations of pohcy and expediency, to which I hoped they would give suitable 

 attention, before they should come to a final decision upon this point. I thought 

 it my duty to suggest them, that they might not be overlooked. The subject was 

 viewed by my countrymen as highly important, and I was anxious to omit no effort 

 which might possibly have an influence in promoting friendly sentiments between the 

 two nations, or in guarding against the excitement of others. These fisheries afforded 

 the means of subsistence to multitudes of people who were destitute of any other; 

 they also afforded the^ means of remittance to Great Britain in payment for articles 

 of her manufactures exported to America. It was well understood to be the policy 

 of Great Britain that no unnecessary stimulus should be given to the manufactures 

 in the United States, which would diminish the importation of those from Great 

 Britain. But, by depriving the fishermen of the United States of this source of sub- 

 sistence, the result must be to throw them back upon the country, and drive them at 

 the present time, entitled to prosecute their fisheries within the limits of the British to 

 the resort of manufacturing for themselves; while, on the other hand, it would cut off 

 the means of making remittances in payment for the manufactures of Great Britain. 

 I thought it best to urge every consideration which might influence a party having 

 other views in that respect, to avoid coming to a collision upon it. I would even 

 urge considerations of humanity. I would say that fisheries, the nature of which was 

 to multiply the means of subsistence to mankind, were usually considered by civilised 

 nations as under a sort of special sanction. It was a common practice to have them 



