496 APPENDIX 



which is not a sovereign right, but a purely economic right, to the inhabitants of 

 .another State; 



(d) Because the doctrine of International servitude in the sense which is now sought 

 to be attributed to it originated in the peculiar and now obsolete conditions prevailing 

 in the Holy Roman. Empire of which the domini lerrae were not fully sovereigns; they 

 holding territory under the Roman Empire, subject at least theoretically, and in some 

 respects also practically, to the Courts of that Empire; their right being, moreover, 

 rather of a civil than of a public nature, partaking more of the character of dominium 

 than of imperium, and therefore certainly not a complete sovereignty. And because 

 in contradistinction to this quasi-sovereighty with its incoherent attributes acquired 

 at various times, by various means, and not impaired in its character by being incom- 

 plete in any one respect or by being limited in favor of another territory and its pos- 

 sessor, the modern State, and particularly Great Britain, has never admitted partition 

 of sovereignty, owing to the constitution of a modern State requiring essential sover- 

 eignty and independence; 



(e) Because this doctrine being but little suited to the principle of sovereignty 

 which prevails in States under a system of constitutional government such as Great 

 Britain and the United States, and to the present International relations of Sovereign 

 States, has found little, if any, support from modern publicists. It could therefore 

 in the general interest of the Community of Nations, and of the Parties to this 

 Treaty, be affirmed by this Tribunal only on the express evidence of an Inter- 

 national contract; 



(/) Because even if these liberties of fishery constituted an International servitude, 

 the servitude would derogate from the sovereignty of the servient State only in so 

 far as the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the servient State would be contrary 

 to the exercise of the servitude right by the dominant State. Whereas it is evident 

 that, though every regulation of the fishery is to some extent a limitation, as it puts 

 limits to the exercise of the fishery at will, yet such regulations as are reasonable and 

 made for the purpose of securing and preserving the fishery and its exercise for the com- 

 mon benefit, are clearly to be distinguished from those restrictions and "molestations," 

 the annulment of which was the purpose of the American demands formulated by Mr. 

 Adams in 1782, and such regulations consequently cannot be held to be inconsistent 

 with a servitude; 



(g) Because the fishery to which the inhabitants of the United States were admitted 

 in 1783, and again in 1818, was a regulated fishery, as is evidenced by the following 

 regulations : 



Act IS Charles II, Cap. 16, s. 7 (1663) forbidding "to lay any seine or other net 

 in or near any harbour in Newfoundland, whereby to take the spawn or young fry of 

 the Poor- John, or for any other use or uses, except for the taking of bait only," which 

 had not been superseded either by the order in council of March loth, 1670, or by the 

 statute 10 and XI Wm. Ill, Cap. 25, 1699. The order in council provides expressly 

 for the obligation "to submit unto and to observe all rules and orders as are now, 

 or hereafter shall be established," an obligation which cannot be read as referring only 

 to the rules establis]}ed by this very act, and having no reference to anteceding rules 

 "as are now established." In a similar way, the statute of 1699 preserves in force 

 prior legislation, conferring the freedom of fishery only "as fully and freely as at any- 

 time heretofore." The order in council, 1670, provides that the Admirals, who 

 always were fishermen, arriving from an English or Welsh port, "see that His 

 Majesty's rules and orders concerning the regulation of the fisheries are duly put m 



