AWARD OF THE TRIBUNAL 499 



portance, e.g. that of holding land; and the purport of the provisions in question 

 consequently was to preserve these discriminations. But no such discriminations 

 existing in the common enjoyment of the fishery by American and British fishermen, 

 no such provision was required; 



(6) Because no proof is furnished of similar exemptions of foreigners from local 

 legislation in default of Treaty stipulations subjecting them thereto; 



(c) Because no such express provision for subjection of the nationals of either Party 

 to local law was made either in this Treaty, in respect to their reciprocal admission to 

 certain territories as agreed in Art. Ill, or in Art. Ill of the Treaty of 1794; although 

 such subjection was clearly contemplated by the Parties. 



For the purpose of such proof it is further contended by the United States: 



(7) That, as the liberty to dry and cure on the Treaty coasts and to enter bays and 

 harbours on the non-treaty coasts are both subjected to conditions, and the latter to 

 specific restrictions, it should therefore be held that the liberty to fish should be sub- 

 jected to no restrictions, as none are provided for in the Treaty. 



The Tribunal is unable to apply the principle of "expressio unius exclusio allerius" 

 to this case: 



(a) Because the conditions and restrictions as to the liberty to dry and cure on 

 the shore and to enter the harbours are limitations of the rights themselves, and not 

 restrictions of their exercise. Thus the right to dry and cure is limited in duration, 

 and the right to enter bays and harbours is limited to particular purposes; 



(i) Because these restrictions of the right to enter bays and harbours applying 

 solely to American fishermen must have been expressed in the Treaty, whereas regu- 

 lations of the fishery, appl3ang equally to American and British, are made by right of 

 territorial sovereignty. 



For the purpose of such proof it has been contended by the United States: 



(8) That Lord Bathtjrst in 1815 mentioned the American right under the Treaty 

 of 1783 as a right to be exercised "at the discretion of the United States"; and that 

 this should be held as to be derogatory to the claim of exclusive regulation by Great 

 Britain. 



But the Tribunal is unable to agree with this contention: 



(o) Because these words implied only the necessity of an express stipulation for 

 any liberty to use foreign territory at the pleasure of the grantee, without touching 

 any question as to regulation; 



(b) Because in this same letter Lord Bathurst characterized this right as a policy 

 "temporary and experimental, depending on the use that might be made of it, on 

 the condition of the islands and places where it was to be exercised, and the more 

 general conveniences or inconveniences from a military, naval and commercial point 

 of view"; so that it cannot have been his intention to acknowledge the exclusion of 

 British interference with this right; 



(c) Because Lord Bathurst in his note to Governor Sir C. Hamilton in 1819 

 orders the Governor to take care that the American fishery on the coast of Labrador 

 be carried on in the same manner as previous to the late war; showing that he did not 

 interpret the Treaty just signed as a grant conveying absolute immunity from inter- 

 ference with the American fishery right. 



For the purpose of such proof it is further contended by the United States: 



(9) That on various other occasions following the conclusion of the Treaty, as 

 evidenced by official correspondence, Great Britain made use of expressions incon- 

 sistent with the claim to a right of regulation. 



