DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL SENSE. 199 



originated from mutual sympathy ; but courage, and in 

 most cases strengtli, must haye been prsTiously acquired, 

 probably through natural selection. 



THE LOVE OF APPKOBATION. 



Pa 109 Although man has no special instincts to 



tell him how to aid his fellow-men, he still 

 has the impulse, and with his improved intellectual facul- 

 ties would naturally be much guided in this respect by 

 reason and experience. Instinctive sympathy would also 

 cause him to value highly the approbation of his fellows ; 

 for, as Mr. Bain has clearly shown, the love of praise and 

 the strong feeling of glory, and the still stronger horror of 

 scorn and infamy, "are due to the workings of sym- 

 pathy." Consequently, man would be influenced in the 

 highest degree by the wishes, approbation, and blame of 

 his fellow-men, as expressed by their gestures and lan- 

 guage. Thus the social instincts, which must have been 

 acquired by man in a very rude state, and probably even 

 by his early ape-like progenitors, still give the impulse to 

 some of his best actions ; but his actions are in a higher 

 degree determined by the expressed wishes and judgment 

 of his fellow-men, and unfortunately very often by his 

 own strong selfish desires. But as love, sympathy, and 

 self-command become strengthened by habit, and as the 

 power of reasoning becomes clearer, so that man can 

 value justly the judgments of his fellows, he will feel 

 himself impelled, apart from any transitory pleasure or 

 pain, to certain lines of conduct. He might then declare 

 — ^not that any barbarian or uncultivated man could thus 

 think — I am the supreme judge of my own conduct, and, 

 in the words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate 

 the dignity of humanity. 



