44° CONSCIOUSNESS 
accompanies the behaviour which leads to future guidance, but 
the consciousness that arises from the results of the behaviour. 
Let us willingly grant that the newly hatched, and as yet in- 
experienced chick, when it pecks at a small object is conscious 
of a visual impression, and is conscious also of movements of 
its neck and beak. These do not constitute the experience by 
which it profits. This is provided by the results of the peck- 
ing, according as the morsel seized is nice or nasty. We may 
say, in popular language, that the little bird remembers when 
it sees a similar object that the former results were pleasant or 
distasteful, as the case may be; and that it is through this 
remembrance that future guidance is rendered possible. But 
all the evidence that we possess goes to show that the sensory 
centres, stimulated by what we will assume to be the taste of 
the morsel, are different from those which are affected by 
sight, and the movements concerned in pecking. So that the 
consciousness which is effective in guiding future action is an 
accompaniment of the stimulation of centres that are different 
from those concerned in the behaviour over which guidance 
is exercised. And if this interpretation of the observed facts 
be correct, it supports the conclusions reached from @ priori 
considerations. It seems further to show that, not only is a 
nervous system necessary for the occurrence of controlled 
behaviour, but that no little complexity in its intercommunica- 
tions is essential. 
It may be urged that the chick’s behaviour which has 
been selected for purposes of illustration, and the inter- 
pretation we have put upon it, throws too much stress on 
remembrance, so called, and further gives the false impression 
that all experience must be for future guidance. There are 
surely numberless cases, it will be said, in which nothing of 
the nature of distinct memory is involved, and in which the 
guidance of consciousness is exercised at once over present 
behaviour, without any postponement to the future. Even 
omitting for the present the former point, the formula implied 
—that present experience is for future guidance—cannot be 
accepted in view of the familiar fact that present experience is 
