60 CONSCIOUSNESS 
of certain elements introduced during the development of 
a like situation, we shall call it an intelligent act. But if we 
have grounds for supposing that the situation is reflectively 
considered by the chick in relation to an ideal and more or 
less definitely conceived plan of action which is (perhaps 
dimly) taking form in its mind, we shall regard it as so far 
rational. And so, too, in other cases of animal behaviour. Now, 
with regard to the control through which consciousness is 
effective in the guidance of behaviour, it is necessary, in view 
of these considerations, to distinguish its intelligent from its 
rational exercise. And this is of importance since we generally 
speak of control in the latter sense in reference to human 
conduct. Intelligent control (on the perceptual plane) is due 
to the direct operation of the results of experience without 
the intervention of any generalized conception or ideal. In 
rational control (on the ideational plane), such conceptions 
and ideals exert a controlling influence. If, to prevent a boy 
sucking his thumb we administer bitter aloes, we trust to 
intelligent control through the immediate effects of experience ; 
but if he be induced to give up the habit because it is babyish, 
he so far exercises rational control. What we call self-control 
is of this type. Only one more distinction need be drawn. 
Intelligent behaviour, founded on direct association gained 
through previous experience, we shall attribute to impulse; but 
for rational conduct, the outcome of reflection and deliberation, 
we seek to ascertain the motive. In human affairs our motives 
are referred to certain categories each of which presupposes an 
ideal scheme, prudential, esthetic, ethical, or other. To act 
from motive and not from impulse is to act deliberately, 
because we judge the action to be expedient, seemly, or right, 
as the case may be. If, then, we contrast the lower perceptual 
stages of mental evolution with the higher ideational phases, 
the former includes behaviour due to impulse ; but from it 
conduct due to motive is excluded. 
