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continuity. But where conscious life is mainly perceptual, the 
several trains of activity are relatively isolated and discon- 
nected with each other. They do not unite to form a 
continuous system, such as is implied in the conception of a 
person. We must deny personality to animals.” To this I 
would merely add that, even where perceptual continuity in 
animals reaches its maximum, it is not reflectively grasped as 
a whole, and the ideal construction of the personal ego is not 
conceived as antithetical to the impersonal world of objects. 
With what Dr. Stout says about causality I am in complete 
agreement. “We must notice,’* he urges, “the essential 
difference which separates the merely perceptual category from 
that of ideational and conceptual thought. The perceptual 
category is always purely and immediately practical in its 
operation. It is a constitutive form of thought only because 
it is a constitutive form of action. The question ‘Why ?’ has 
no existence for the merely perceptual consciousness. It does 
not and cannot inquire how it is that a certain cause produces 
a certain effect. It does not and cannot endeavour to explain, 
to analyze conditions so as to present a caus? asa reason. It 
does not compare different modes of procedure or different 
groups of circumstances, so as to contradistinguish the precise 
points in which they agree from those in which they disagree, 
and in this way to explain why a certain result should follow 
in one case and a different result in another case. Causality 
in this sense can only exist for the ideational consciousness, 
and the development of the ideational consciousness in this 
direction is a development of conceptual thinking—of gene- 
ralization.” 
Wherein, then, lies the central core of truth in Professor 
Groos’s contention? In the satisfaction that arises from the 
success of any conative activity. We see that the animal 
striving and doing falls within our conception of a cause, in 
the scientific sense of the word,—a relatively constant and 
continuous antecedent of diverse sequent effects. We infer 
that pleasure accompanies the satisfaction of the multifarious 
* Op. cit., p. 314. 
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