274 THE FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS 
We have already said that the companion, as the nucleus 
of a situation, is a thing which reacts in altogether special ways, 
so that it becomes differentiated from other things as some- 
thing the meaning of which, and the interest in which, are sw 
generis and unique intype. It becomes the centre of emotional 
situations, which we ascribe to rivalry, emulation, jealousy, 
and so forth. And we have also drawn attention to the view 
that the genetic order, so far as there is an order, is not first 
the ego and then the alter, but first the mother and com- 
panions and then through them the self. We learn to know 
ourselves only through knowing others. We must now ask 
the question—a question which must be answered before we 
can touch on the possible ethics of animals—how far, and in 
what sense, the social animal regards others as of like nature 
to itself, and capable also of like feelings and emotions. 
Stated in this form we must, I think, answer the question in 
the negative. The expression, “of like nature to itself,” 
impligs that the self has already taken more or less definite 
form, and that the animal infers that, since the alter behaves 
and reacts in like manner to the ego, it also is an ego. This 
is distinctly an act of reasoning. As Clifford phrased it, the 
companion becomes an eject. We can never by direct ex- 
perience become acquainted with the feelings of others, but 
we can endow them ejectively with personality analogous to 
our own. 
But, though it is exceedingly doubtful whether any animal 
can regard its companion as an “ eject,” may there not be a 
perceptual anticipation of the ideational process that comes 
with later-developed reflection? A decade ago I gave the 
following answer to this question: “For myself, I cannot 
doubt that animals project into each other the shadows of the 
feelings of which they are themselves conscious.” * Professor 
Mark Baldwin speaks of the stage at which this takes place, 
as the “projective stage” of development. “Now, in the 
fact,” he says,t “of herding, common life and arrangements 
* “ Animal Life and Intelligence,” p. 340. 
+ “Mutual Development in the Child and the Race,” p. 19. 
