282 THE FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS 
“the most convenient acceptation of the term, except that 
I should prefer to say simply that it is a feeling of pain 
accompanying and resulting from our nonconformity to 
principle.” According to this definition the existence of a 
principle or ideal is presupposed ; and the fact that Professor 
Mackenzie lays stress upon the pain of nonconformity, shows 
that the ideal is a high one. In the case of the animal, 
however, such an ideal of right conduct has probably not 
taken form. But Mr. Mackenzie also speaks of the “ quasi- 
conscience” begotten of custom. This comes nearer to the 
feeling which animals may be supposed to have when their 
behaviour does not accord with that which through instinct 
or habit is the usage of the community. And if, as seems 
to be shown by observation, animals sometimes punish the 
breaches of such usage—when, for example, cats punish their 
kittens for uncleanliness—the quasi-conscience will assume a 
more developed form. 
We may say, then, that the perceptual data are given in 
animal experience from which, in ideational sublimation, ethical 
ideals may be derived by a process of reflection and generaliza- 
tion. As in the case of esthetics, so in that of ethics ; long ere, 
in the course of mental evolution, the correlative conceptions 
implied in the phrase “right or wrong” had taken definite 
form, perceptual situations must have arisen in which 
behaviour carried with it the feelings of satisfaction or the 
reverse which laid the foundations of that approbation of the 
right which forms the superstructure we build upon them by 
the exercise of reflective thought. 
V.—TueE Evo.ution or FEELING AND Emotion 
“Whatever conditions,” says Dr. Stout,* “further and 
favour conation in the attainment of its end, yield pleasure. 
Whatever conditions obstruct conation in the attainment of 
* “Manual of Psychology,” p. 234. “Displeasure’”’ here means the 
feeling attitude antithetical to “ pleasure.” 
