VII CREATION BY LAW 153 
sifted, and levelled designedly ; the sides and angles of a 
crystal exactly resemble similar forms designed by man; but 
we do not therefore conclude that these effects have, in each 
individual case, required the directing action of a creative 
oe or see any difficulty in their being produced by natural 
aw. 
Beauty in Nature 
Let us, however, leave this general argument for a while, 
and turn to another special case, which has been appealed to 
as conclusive against Mr. Darwin’s views. “Beauty” is, to 
some persons, as great a stumbling-block as “contrivance.” 
They cannot conceive a system of the universe so perfect as 
necessarily to develop every form of beauty, but suppose that 
when anything specially beautiful occurs, it is a step beyond 
what that system could have produced—something which the 
Creator has added for his own delectation. 
Speaking of the humming birds, the Duke of Argyll says: 
“Tn the first place it is to be observed of the whole group, 
that there is no connection which can be traced or conceived, 
between the splendour of the humming birds and any function 
essential to their life. If there were any such connection, 
that splendour could not be confined, as it almost exclusively 
is, to only one sex. The female birds are, of course, not 
placed at any disadvantage in the struggle for existence by 
their more sombre colouring.” And after describing the 
various ornaments of these birds, he says: “Mere ornament 
and variety of form, and these for their own sake, is the only 
principle or rule with reference to which Creative Power 
seems to have worked in these wonderful and beautiful birds. 
. . A crest of topaz is no better in the struggle for existence 
than a crest of sapphire. A frill ending in spangles of 
the emerald is no better in the battle of life than a frill ending 
in spangles of the ruby. A tail is not affected for the pur- 
poses of flight, whether its marginal or its central feathers are 
decorated with white. ... Mere beauty and mere variety, 
for their own sake, are objects which we ourselves seek when 
we can make the forces of nature subordinate to the attain- 
ment of them. There seems to be no conceivable reason why 
we should doubt or question that these are ends and aims 
