Ix LIMITS OF NATURAL SELECTION IN MAN 209 
molecular combinations, subject to definite changes under the 
stimuli of heat, moisture, light, electricity, and probably some 
unknown forces. But this greater and greater complexity, 
even if carried to an infinite extent, cannot, of itself, have the 
slightest tendency to originate consciousness in such molecules 
or groups of molecules. If a material element, or a combina- 
tion of a thousand material elements in a molecule, are alike 
unconscious, it is impossible for us to believe that the mere 
addition of one, two, or a thousand other material elements to 
form a more complex molecule, could in any way tend to 
produce a self-conscious existence. The things are radically 
unlike, exclusive, and incommensurable. To say that mind is a 
product or function of protoplasm, or of its molecular changes, 
is to use words to which we can attach no clear conception ; 
and those who argue thus should put forth a precise definition 
of matter with clearly enunciated properties, and show that 
the necessary result of a certain complex arrangement of the 
elements or atoms of that matter will be the production of self- 
consciousness. ‘There is no escape from this dilemma,—either 
all matter is conscious, or consciousness is, or pertains to, some- 
thing distinct from matter, and in the latter case its presence 
in material forms is a proof of the existence of conscious beings, 
outside of, and independent of, what we term matter.} 
1 A friend has suggested that I have not here explained myself sufficiently, 
and objects that life does not exist in matter any more than consciousness, 
and if the onecan be produced by the laws of matter, why may not the other ? 
I reply that there is a radical difference between the two. Organic or 
vegetative life consists essentially in chemical transformations and molecular 
motions, occurring under certain conditions and in a certain order. The 
matter and the forces which act upon it are for the most part known; and 
if there are any forces engaged in the manifestation of vegetative life yet 
undiscovered (which is a moot question), we can conceive them as analogous 
to such forces as heat, electricity, or chemical affinity, with which we are 
already acquainted. We can thus clearly conceive of the transition from dead 
matter to living matter. A complex mass which suffers decomposition or 
decay is dead, but if this mass has the power of attracting to itself from the 
surrounding medium, matter like that of which it is composed, we have the 
first rudiment of vegetative life. If the mass can do this for a considerable 
time, and if its absorption of new matter more than replaces that lost by 
decomposition, and if it is of such a nature as to resist the mechanical or 
chemical forces to which it is usually exposed, and to retain a tolerably 
constant form, we term it a living organism. We can conceive an organism to 
be so constituted, and we can further conceive that any fragments, which may 
be accidentally broken from it, or which may fall away when its bulk has 
become too great for the cohesion of all its parts, may begin to increase anew 
P 
