42 LUCK, OR CUNNING? 



without an attempt to call attention to that other 

 view, ia virtue of which we are able to extend to many 

 an idea we had been accustomed to confine to one. 



In his chapter on Memory, Mr. Spencer certainly 

 approaches the Heringian view. He says, " On thf 

 one hand. Instinct may be regarded as a kind of 

 organised memory; on the other. Memory may be 

 regarded as a kind of incipient instinct " (" Principles 

 of Psychology," ed. 2, vol. i p. 44S). Here the ball 

 has fallen Into his hands, but if he had got firm hold 

 of it he could not have written, " Instinct may he re- 

 garded as a kind of, &c. ; " to us there is neither " may 

 be regarded as " nor " kind of " about it ; we require, 

 " Instinct is inherited memory," with an explanation 

 making it intelligible how memory can come to be 

 inherited at all. I do not like, again, calling memory 

 " a kind of incipient instinct ; " as Mr. Spencer puts 

 them the words have a pleasant antithesis, but 

 " instinct is inherited memory '' covers all the ground, 

 and to say that memory is uninherited instinct is 

 surplusage. 



Nor does he stick to it long when he says that 

 " instinct is a kind of organised memory," for two pages 

 later he says that memory, to be memory at all, must 

 be tolerably conscious or deliberate ; he, therefore (vol. 

 i. p. 447), denies that there can be such a thing as 

 unconscious memory ; but without this it is impossible 

 for us to see instinct as the "kind of organised memory" 

 which he has just been calling it, inasmuch as in- 

 stinct is notably undeliberate and unreflecting. 



A few pages farther on (vol. i. p. 452) he finds 



