310 LVCK, OR CUNNING? 



of mentally ctaracterising and docketing our estimates ■ 

 of the different kinds of motion going on in this other- 

 wise uncognisable substratum. 



Our conception, then, concerning the nature of ^ny 

 matter depends solely upon its kind and degree of 

 unrest, that is to say, on the characteristics of the 

 vibrations that are going on within it. The exterior 

 object vibrating in a certain way imparts some of its 

 vibrations to our brain — but if the state of the thing 

 itself depends upon its vibrations, it must be considered 

 as to all intents and purposes the vibrations themselves 

 — plus, of course, the imderlying substance that is 

 vibrating. If, for example, a pat of butter is a portion 

 of the unknowable underlying substance in such-and- 

 such a state of molecular disturbance, and it is only by 

 alteration of the disturbance that the substance can be 

 altered — the disturbance of the substance is practically 

 equivalent to the substance : a pat of butter is such- 

 and-such a disturbance of the unknowable underlying 

 substance, and such-and-such a disturbance of the 

 underlying substance is a pat of butter. In com- 

 municating its vibrations, therefore, to our brain a 

 substance does actually communicate what is, as far as 

 we are concerned, a portion of itself Our perception 

 of a thing and its attendant feeling are symbols attach- 

 ing to an introduction within our brain of a feeble 

 state of the thing itself. Our recollection of it is 

 occasioned by a feeble continuatfce of this feeble state 

 in our brains, becoming less feeble through the acces- 

 sion of fresh but similar vibrations from without. The 

 molecular vibrations which make the thing an idea of 



