6 



CONTEACTS CONCERNING HOKSES, ETC. 



less within the statute because something else, which was 

 merely ancillary to its principal subject-matter, and to 

 which the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds did not 

 apply, was included in it, as the contract was an entire one 

 and the price was indivisible (|5). 

 EequiBites of Therefore to make the sale of a horse at 10/. or upwards 



a sale of goods y^lid under the 4th section of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 

 thaTm ^^ the buyer must either actually accept and receive it, or give 

 something in earnest to bind the bargain, or something m 

 part payment; or the parties to be charged must either 

 themselves or by their agents make and sign some note or 

 memorandum in writing of the bargain. 

 We shall consider — 



1st. The acceptance and receipt. 



2nd. The earnest and part payment. 



3rd. The note or memorandum in writing. 



4th. The signature by the party to be charged. 



5th. The signature by an agent. 



In what they 

 consist. 



General rule. 



The Acceptance and Eeceipt. 



To satisfy the statute there must be an acceptance and a 

 receipt of the goods, and the acceptance must be of the 

 goods " so sold," for the enjoyment of something merely 

 engrafted upon the principal subject-matter of the contract 

 will not satisfy the statute (|j). The acceptance must be 

 with the intention of taking possession as owner. And the 

 receipt implies delivery, either actual or constructive (q). 



By s. 4, sub-s. (3), of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 

 " there is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this 

 section when the buyer does any act in relation to the goods 

 which recognises a pre-existing contract of sale whether 

 there be an acceptance in performance of the contract or 

 not." 



There is always an acceptance and receipt by the pur- 

 chaser when the vendor has parted with his Hen, because, 

 as was laid down by Mr. Justice Holroyd, " upon a sale 

 of specific goods for a specific price, by parting with the 

 possession the seller parts with his lien. The statute 

 contemplates such a parting with the possession, and 

 therefore, so long as the seller preserves his control over 

 the goods, so as to retain his lien, he prevents the vendee 



(p) Harman v. Reeve, 25 L. J., 

 C. P. 257. 



[q) See per Parke, B., Saunders v. 



Topi}, i Ex. 394; Bolmes v. Mos- 

 Iciiis, 9 Ex. 753. 



