THE ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT. 



9 



been made, the carriage was, at A.'s request, placed in the 

 back shop. A. called at the shop on a Saturday, and 

 requested B. to hire a horse and a man for him, and to send 

 the carriage to his house on the following day, in order that 

 he might take a drive in it. A. had previously intimated 

 his intention to take the carriage out a few times, in order 

 that, as he was going to take it abroad, it might pass the 

 custom-house as a second-hand carriage. The carriage was 

 accordingly sent to and used by A. on the Sunday, A. 

 paying for the hire of the horse and man. A. afterwards 

 refused to take or pay for the carriage. It was held that 

 there was a sufficient acceptance and receipt of the carriage 

 by A before the Sunday, within the 17th section of the 

 Statute of Frauds (/). 



In some cases great difficulty arises in deciding whether What has 

 there has been such an acceptance and receipt as consti- ffi"- ^fag 

 tutes a constructive delivery under the statute ; and we shall an acceptance 

 see by the following cases that some very nice distinctions ami receipt, 

 have been drawn : Elmore v. Stone (g) is a leading case on 

 the subject, and, though its authority was doubted by Mr. 

 Justice Bayley in llotve v. Palmer (A), it will be seen that 

 it may be distinguished from that and all the following 

 cases. 



In Elmore v. Stone (g) an action was brought for the 

 price of two horses, and a question arose whether there had 

 been a delivery of them under the Statute of Frauds. The 

 plaintiff was a livery-stable keeper and horse dealer. He asked 

 180 guineas for two horses, which the defendant at first 

 refused to give, but afterwards sent word that " the horses 

 were his, but that as he had neither servant nor stable the 

 plaintiff must keep them at livery for him ; " the plaintiff 

 assented, and removed them out of the sale stable into 

 another. The defendant afterwards refused to take them, 

 and set up for his defence the 17th section of the Statute 

 of Frauds. It was there held that if a man bargains for 

 the purchase of goods, and desires the vendor to keep them 

 in his possession for an especial purpose for the vendee, and 

 the vendor accepts the order, it is a sufficient delivery of the 

 goods within the Statute of Frauds, and that it is no objec- 

 tion to a constructive delivery of goods that it is made by 

 words parcel of the parol contract of sale ; and Chief Justice 



(/) Beaumont-v. Brengen,bC.'&. 

 301. 



(g) Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunt. 458 ; 

 10 E. R. 578. See also KMle v. 



Gough, 38 L. T., N. S. 204— C. A. 

 (/») Bmoe V. Palmer, 3 B. & Aid. 

 324. 



