FAIRS AND MARKETS OVERT. 51 



separated from the hall by the yard (A). And, "under 

 that state of facts," said Cockburn, C. J., "it is impossible 

 to say that the sale took place in the dwelling-place of the 

 respondent; for the place is entirely separated from his 

 dwelling-house ; and assuming (contrary to my opinion) 

 that a distinction was intended by the use of the phrase 

 ' dwelling-place,' instead of ' dwelling-house,' which occurs 

 in some of the other statutes, and that ' dwelling-place ' 

 may apply to somewhat larger and more extensive premises 

 than the term ' dwelling-house ' would apply to ; yet I do 

 not think that in any sense of the term can those premises 

 be said to be the dwelling-place of the respondent, separated 

 as they are from the place in which he lives. Then, is it 

 his shop ? I am of opinion that it is not. It cannot, in 

 any proper sense of the term, be called a shop. I agree 

 that there may be cases in which the term ' shop,' in its 

 popular sense, would not be applicable to the premises in 

 which things were sold or exposed for sale, and yet, by a 

 liberal and rational construction of the Act, the premises 

 might be considered as within the exception of 'shop.' 

 Take, for instance, the place of business of a horsedealer 

 who has stables in which he keeps horses for sale, either as 

 his own or on commission. Although tolls are payable for 

 the sale of horses in the market, it would be, perhaps, too 

 much to say that the horsedealer is not at liberty to sell 

 horses on his own premises, as not being within the excep- 

 tion of ' shop ' in the statute. I think we might say that, 

 on fair construction, the horsedealer's premises were 'a 

 shop ' within that term as used in section 13. But each case 

 must depend on its particular circumstances. Although, as 

 I have said, the premises of a horsedealer might come 

 within the exception, it is a very different thing when we 

 have to deal with an extensive area like the present, which 

 is, in fact, nearly as extensive as the market-place itself. 

 It is true that the auction itself took place in a building, 

 but the sheep and other things, the subject of the sale, 

 were exposed for sale in this large yard and kept there. 

 To say that this could be a ' shop ' within the meaning of 

 this section would be, as it appears to me, quite unreason- 

 able. I own my individual opinion is rather strong against 

 an auctioneer's premises being a ' shop ' at all within the 

 meaning of the section, but it is not necessary to determine 



{k) Fearon v. Mitchell, L. E., 7 Q. B. 690 ; 41 L. J., M. C. 170 ; 27 

 L. T., N. S. 33. 



E 2 



