52 



FAIRS AND MARKETS OVERT, ETC. 



Where a 

 horse at a 

 fair is exempt 

 from distress. 



Sale of 

 diseased 

 animals iu 

 market. 



Stat. 24 & 25 

 Vict. c. 96. 



Description in 

 an indictment. 



that. Assuming that an auctioneer's premises might be a 

 shop for the purpose of selling, so as to come within the 

 exception, it seems to me impossible to say that these 

 extensive premises, being in the open air and capable of 

 holding so many hundred sheep, can in any sense of the 

 term be brought within the description of a shop " (/). 



A horse which brings goods to market to be sold is, as 

 well as the goods themselves, exempt from distress, for the 

 sake of public utility (m). 



Where a statute prohibited persons from sending animals 

 affected with a contagious disease to market, and inflicted 

 penalties on any person so sending them, the act of sending 

 them, if known to be so infected, was a public offence, but 

 did not amount by implication to a representation that they 

 were sound, and did not of itself raise, as between the 

 vendor of the animals and the purchaser of them, any right 

 on the part of the purchaser to claim damages in respect of 

 an injury he had suffered in consequence of their pur- 

 chase («) . 



Horse Stealing. 



By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 10, it is enacted, that " who- 

 soever shall steal any horse, mare, gelding, colt or filly, or 

 any bull, cow, ox, heifer or calf, or any ram, ewe, sheep or 

 lamb, shall be guilty of felony : " and by section 11, it is 

 enacted, that "whosoever shall wilfully kill any animal 

 with intent to steal the carcase, skin or any part of the 

 animal so killed, shall be guilty of felony " (o). 



In an indictment for horse stealing under 7 & 8 Geo. 4, 

 c. 29, s. 25, the phraseology of which section has been 

 followed in this respect by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 10, it was 

 held, that the animal, whether a horse, mare, gelding, colt 

 or filly, might be described as a "horse,"' although the 

 statute specified the particular species and gender (p) • and 

 the construction thus given to the former statute would pro- 

 bably make it unnecessary to amend in a like case an in- 

 dictment under the present statute. Now, upon any similar 

 objection being taken, not covered, as in this case, by an 



(l) Fearun v. MUchcll, L. R., 7 

 Q. B. 294, 295. See also M'Hoh v. 

 Dmies, 1 ft. B. D. 59; 45 L. J., 

 M. C. 30; 33 L. T., N. S. 502; 

 24 W. R. 343. 



(m) See Francis v. Wyatt, 3 Burr. 

 1602, and the authorities there cited. 



(n) Ward ¥. Mohhs, 4 App. Cas., 

 13; 48 L. J., C. P. 281; 40 L. T. 

 N. S. 73; 27 W. R. 114. 



(o) Repealing but substantially re- 

 enacting 7 & 8 Geo. i, 0. 29, b. 25. 



(p) Sex V. Aldridge, 4 Cox, C. C. 

 143. 



