SALE AND WAKKANTY BY AN AGENT. 123 



he warrants the horse, may fairly be presumed to be acting 

 within the scope of his authority. This is the common and 

 usual manner in which the business is done, and the agent 

 must be taken to be vested with powers to transact the 

 business with which he is entrusted in the common and 

 usual manner (m)." In that case no special reference was 

 made to the fact that the horse was sold at a fair, and if 

 the foregoing decision was intended to refer to sales by 

 special agents generally, it must be taken to be overruled 

 by Brady v. Todd. In a comparatively recent case, how- 

 ever, the facts contemplated by Erie, C.J., in Brady v. Todd 

 as raising an implication of authority to warrant on the 

 part of a special agent did arise, and it was held that a 

 servant entrusted by his master with the sale of a horse at 

 a fair might have an imphed authority to warrant («). 



But wherever a general authority is given by a principal Warranty by 

 to an agent, this impKes and includes a right to do all » servant as 

 subordinate acts incident to and necessary for the execution S™era agen . 

 of that authority ; then, if notice is not given to the person 

 with whom the agent deals that the principal has limited 

 his authority, the principal is bound (o). In accordance 

 then with this principle of law, a servant employed by a 

 horsedealer as his general agent to carry on his business, 

 has an implied authority to warrant the horses sold by him 

 for his principal as sound without any special authority for 

 that purpose. 



The case of Howard v. Sheward {p) very clearly illustrates 

 the rule that the agent or servant of a horsedealer has an 

 implied authority to bind his principal or master by a 

 warranty. In that case it appeared that the defendant 

 was a horsedealer, and that in March, 1866, the plaintiff, 

 being at a riding-school, asked the proprietor "if he knew 

 of a horse that would be likely to suit him," and that 

 David Sheward, the brother of the defendant, who happened 

 to be present, and who was a horsedealer, and occasionally 

 acted in the sale of horses for the defendant, said he thought 

 the latter had one. After some conversation the horse in 

 question was brought to the riding-school, and there ridden 

 by the plaintiff and approved of by him; and David 

 Sheward, in answer to questions as to the character and 

 soundness of the animal, said, "I'll guarantee the horse is 



Im) Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camp. (o) Per M. of E., CoUm v. Gardner, 



555 • 11 K. R. 797. 21 Beav. 543. 



In) Brooks v. Sassall, 49 L. T., {p) L. E., 2 C. P. 148; 36 L. J., 



N.S.569. C.P.42. 



