PLEADING AND EVIDENCE FOE THE DEFENDANT. 



187 



the purpose for whicli lie was bought ; for instance, that he 

 has answered his warranty when used by persons of ordinary 

 skill (/). . 



But where a horse is proved to have had a disease at the Subsequent 

 time of sale, his subsequent recovery is no defence to an '''"^"'^^'T- 

 action on a breach of warranty, because where a horse is 

 warranted it is to be presumed he is fit for immediate 

 use {g). 



Damages. 



The damages which necessarily, and by implication of law, General 

 ensue from the non-performance of the contract, or the com- d^^^ages. 

 mission of the ivrongfiil act, need not be expressly detailed, 

 and are recoverable under the common conclusion of the 

 statement of claim {h). 



But damages which really took place, but do not neces- Special 

 sarily arise from the non-performance of the contract, or the '^'""^g'^'^- 

 commission of the wrongful act, and are not implied by laic, 

 must be expressly stated in the statemeijt of claim ; so thai 

 the defendant may be prepared to dispute the facts. 



The damages must be the legal and natural consequences I-'^gal and 

 of the breach of contract, or of the injury which has been gZ^nceTof 

 inflicted («'). Thus the costs of an action brought on a false the breach of 

 representation made by a third person of the profits of a contract, 

 business, such third person not having been communicated 

 with before the action was brought, nor having represented 

 himself as agent for the defendants in that action, are not 

 the legal and natural consequences of the breach of contract 

 or of the injury which has been infiicted {k). But it is 

 otherwise, when on the third person being communicated 

 with, before action was brought, he said that the plaintiffs 

 might safely go on with their action, and also professed to 

 have authority as agent for the representations which he 

 made (l). 



This rule illustrates the maxim " In jure nan remota 

 causa sed proxima spectatur" — it is the proximate only and 

 not the remote consequences of an act that are to be re- 



(/) Geddes v. Pennington, 5 Dow, 

 164. 



{g) Coates v. Stephens, 2 M. & 

 Eob. 157. 



(A) See Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & 

 C. 152; Bullen& Leake's Pleadings, 

 4th ed. 19. 



(») See 1 Chit. Pleading, 6th ed. 

 395 ; also Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 



3 ; 9 E. E. 361 ; Smith y. Green, 1 

 C. P. D. 92; 45 L. J., C. P. 28; 

 Randall v. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102 ; 

 46 L. J., Q. B. 259 ; 36 L. T., N. S. 

 164 ; 25 W. E. 313— C. A. 



{k) Richardson v. Dunn, 30 L. J., 

 C. p. 44. 



(Z) Randell v. Trimen, 25 L. J., 

 C. P. 307. 



