264 CARRYING HORSES. 



excessive and unreasonable ; and, thirdly, that the condition 

 being void, the plaintiff, although there was no negligence 

 on the part of the defendants, was entitled to recover the 

 full value of the dog against them as common carriers. 



The judgment in this case was reversed in the Exchequer 

 Chamber (c), and, as reversed, was the subject of some 

 discussion in Ashendon v. London, Brighton and South 

 Coast Railway (d), where it was held that a condition that a 

 railway company will not be liable " in any case " for loss 

 or damage to a horse or dog above certain specified values 

 delivered to them for carriage, unless the value is declared, 

 is not reasonable, as it is in its terms unconditional, and 

 would, if valid, protect the company even in case of the 

 negligence or wilful misconduct of their servants ; and the 

 Court further gave its opinion that the judgment of the 

 Exchequer Chamber was in effect overruled by Peek v. North 

 Staffordshire Raihvay Company (e). 



Where a condition contained in a ticket signed by a 

 person delivering a dog for carriage to a railway company 

 stated that " the company are not and will not be common 

 carriers of dogs, nor will they receive dogs for conveyance 

 except on the terms that they shall not be responsible for 

 the amount of damages for the loss thereof, or for injury 

 thereto beyond the sum of 21. unless a higher value be 

 declared at the time of delivery to the company and a per 

 centage of 5 per cent, paid upon the excess of value beyond 

 the 21. so declared ; it was held that although the railway 

 company were not bound to be common carriers of dogs, yet, 

 being bound by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, 

 to afford reasonable facilities for the carriage of dogs, they 

 could only limit their liability in respect thereof by reason- 

 able conditions, and that the above mentioned condition was 

 not just and reasonable within section 7 of that Act ; and, 

 therefore, did not protect the company from liability to an 

 amount exceeding 21. in respect of damage done to the dog 

 through the negligence of their servants (/). 

 ■\\"here value But where the condition as to an increased rate for 



clared'^ '^'^' increased value is not objectionable on the ground of excess 

 or otherwise, a wilfully false statement as to the value of 

 a horse to be conveyed made by the plaintiff in order that 



{e) 31 L. J., Q. B. 113. (/) Dickson v. Great Northern 



{d) 5 Ex. D. 190; 42L. T., N. S. Sm/. Co., IS Q-B. D. 176; 36 L. J., 



586. Q. B. Ill; 55 L. T., N. S. 868— 



(e) Ante, p. 256. C. A. 



