268 



CARRYING HORSES. 



Onus of proof. 



General effect 

 of the deci- 

 sions as to 

 conditions. 



Delirery by 

 carrier. 



Notice of 



"'Wilful miscorduct,' " said Bram well, L.J. (x), "means 

 misconduct to which the will is a party, something opposed 

 to accident or negligence, the misconduct, not the conduct, 

 must be wilful. It has been said, and I think, correctly, 

 that perhaps one condition of wilful misconduct must be 

 that the person guilty of it should know that mischief will 

 result from it. But to my mind there might be other 

 ' wilful misconduct.' I think it would be wilful misconduct 

 if a man did an act not knowing whether mischief would 

 or would not result from it." 



The withholding of cattle under a groundless claim to 

 detain them is not " detention " within the meaning of 

 conditions that the company are not to be liable in respect 

 of loss, or detention, or injury, except upon proof that such 

 loss, detention, or injury, arose from the wilful misconduct 

 of the company or its servants («/). 



The onus of proving that a condition is reasonable, lies 

 upon the company (s). 



It will have been seen by a consideration of the cases 

 that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a condition 

 depends upon the nature of the articles to be conveyed, the 

 degree of risk attendant upon their conveyance, the rate of 

 charge made, and all the circumstances of each particular 

 case. 



Very slight evidence of non-delivery is sufficient to call 

 upon the defendant to prove delivery (a). If the carrier 

 deliver the goods at the place directed in accordance with 

 the ordinary usage, he has fulfilled his obligation, although 

 he has delivered them to a person the sender did not 

 intend (i). Where cattle sent by railway were kept at the 

 arrival station with the sanction of the plaintiff's servant, 

 until they could be removed according to the police regula- 

 tions, it was held that the liability of the railway company 

 as carriers had ceased when the alleged loss and damages 

 occurred (c). 



There is no general rule of law requiring carriers to 



(x) Lewis v. Great iFestern Mail. 

 Co., 3 Q. B. D. at p. 206. 



(y) Gordon v. Great Western Sail. 

 Co., 8 a. B. D. 44; 51 L. J., Q. B. 

 58 ; 45 L. T., N. S. 509 ; 30 "W. E. 

 230. 



(z) Harrison v. London, Brighton 

 and Soiith Coast Rail. Co., 29 L. J., 

 Q. B. 209 ; Leiois T. Great Western 

 Rail. Co., 3 Q. B. D. at p. 205. Per 



Bramwell, L.J. 



{a) Griffiths v. Lee, 1 C. & P. 110; 

 Sawkes v. Smith, Car. & M. 72 ; 

 Eoscoe, N. P., 16th ed. 618. 



(b) M'Kean T. M'lver, L. E., 6 

 Ex. 36 ; 40 L. J., Ex. 30 ; 24 L. T., 

 N. B. 569. 



(c) Sliepherd v. Bristol and Hxeter 

 Rail. Co., L. E., 3 Ex. 189; 37 

 L. J., Ex. 113. 



