NEGLIGENT DRIVING BY A SERVANT. 813 



not support this summing-up, but also to get as much 

 money as he could for his master, and to do it in rivalry 

 with other omnibuses on the road." 



Mr. Justice Byles, after expressing his agreement with Master liable, 

 the direction of "Mr. Baron Martin, said, "The direction "0^^^/^;, 

 amounts to this, that if a person acts in the prosecution of benefit. 

 his master's business for the benefit of his master, and not 

 for the benefit of himself, the master is liable, although the 

 act may in one sense be wilful on the part of the servant. 

 It is said that what was done was contrary to the master's 

 instructions ; but that might be said in ninety-nine out of 

 a hundred cases in which actions are brought for reckless 

 driving. It is also said that the act was illegal. So, in 

 almost every action for negligent driving, an illegal act is 

 imputed to the servant. If we were to hold this direction 

 wrong, in almost every case a driver would come forward 

 and exaggerate his own misconduct, so that the master 

 would be absolved. Looking at what is a reasonable direc- 

 tion, as well as at what has been already decided, I think 

 this summing-up perfectly correct." 



And Mr. Justice Blackburn said, with reference to the Unless done 

 act being done by the defendant when " in the course of his ™' °* *^'i, 

 service and employment," it is "not universally true that servant's em- 

 every act done for the interest of the master is done in ployment. 

 the course of the employment. A footman might think it 

 for the interest of his master to drive the coach, but no one 

 could say that it was within the scope of the footman's 

 employment, and that the master would be liable for 

 damage resulting from the wilful act of the footman in 

 taking charge of the horses. But, in this case, I think 

 the direction given to the jury was a sufficient guide to 

 enable them to say whether the particular act was done in 

 the course of the employment. The learned Judge goes 

 on to say, that the instructions given to the defendants' 

 servants were immaterial if he did not pursue them (upon 

 which all are agreed) ; and at the end of his direction he 

 points out that, if the jury were of opinion ' that the true 

 character of the act of the defendants' servant was, that 

 it was an act of his own and in order to effect a purpose of 

 his own, the defendants were not responsible.' That meets 

 the case which I have already alluded to. If the jury should 

 come to the conclusion that he did the act, not to further 

 his master's interest nor in the course of his employment, 

 but from private spite, and with the object of injuring his 

 enemy, the defendants were not responsible. That removes 



