324 



NEGLIGENCE IN THE USE OF HORSES, ETC. 



Action by 

 representatives 

 of a person 

 kiUed. 



By persons 

 beneficially 

 interested. 



Construction 

 to be put 

 upon the con- 

 dition in 9 & 

 10 Vict. c. 93. 



that the judgment of Byles and Grove, JJ., still holds good, 

 and the law is as above stated (c) . 



Formerly, if a person were killed, no action could be 

 maintained by his representatives. Now, however, deo- 

 dands are abolished {d), and under Lord Campbell's Act (e) 

 a party causing death is liable to an action in all cases 

 where the party injured might himself have maintained 

 one, if death had not ensued. And such action is to be 

 brought, within twelve calendar months of the death of 

 the injured party, by his executor or administrator, and to 

 be "for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and 

 child of the person whose death shall have been so caused," 

 and among whom the damages are to be divided as the 

 jury shall direct (/). A child en ventre sa mere is entitled 

 to sue under this Act on the death of its father by negli- 

 gence (</). 



This Act is amended by and is to be read with the 27 & 

 28 Vict. c. 95, called " An Act for compensating the 

 families of persons killed by accident," by the first section 

 of which, where no action has been brought within six 

 months of the death by the executor or administrator of 

 the person killed, then the action may be brought by the 

 persons beneficially interested in the result of the action. 

 The action may be sustained by a relative of the deceased, 

 though brought within six calendar months from the death, 

 unless there be at the time an executor or administrator of 

 the deceased (/«). By the second section, the money paid 

 into court may be paid in one sum, without regard to its 

 division into shares («'). 



The condition contained in Lord Campbell's Act (e), that 

 the action is maintainable in all cases when the party in- 

 jured might himself have maintained one, if death had not 

 ensued, has reference not to the nature of the loss or injury 

 sustained, but to the circumstances under which the bodily 

 injury arose, and the nature of the wrongful act, neglect 

 or default complained of {k) . Thus, if the deceased has by 

 his own negligence materially contributed to the accident 

 by which he lost his life, as he, if still living, could not 



(c) See also Gibbon v. Standon, 16 

 L. T., N. S. 497— per Byles, J., at 

 N. p. 



(d) 9 & 10 Vict. u. 62. 



(e) Ibid., c. 93. 



(/) Ibid., ss. 1, 2, 3. 

 ((/) Tlie Georife and Rickard, 

 L. £., 3 Adm. J 66; 24 L. T., N. S. 



717. 



(h) ITollci-an v. Sagnell, L. E., 4 

 Ir. 740— C. P. D. 



(i) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95. 



(h) See Haigh v. Royal Mail Steam 

 Taclcet Co., 52 L. J., Q. B. 640 ; 49 

 L. T.,N. S. 802; 48 J. P. 230— 

 C.A. 



