826 



NEGLIGENCE IN THE USE OF HORSES, ETC. 



Damages. 



too 



remote. 



are infringements of different rights, and give rise to dis- 

 tinct causes of action ; and therefore the recovery in an 

 action of compensation for damage to the goods is no bar to 

 an action subsequently commenced for the injury to_ the 

 person. Thus where the plaintiff brought an action in a 

 county court for damage to his cab occasioned by the neg- 

 ligence of the defendant's servant, and, having recovered 

 the amount claimed, afterwards brought an action in the 

 High Court against the defendant, claiming damages for 

 personal injury due to the same negligence ; it was held, 

 by Brett, M.R., and Bowen, L.J., Lord Coleridge, C.J., 

 dissenting, that the latter action was maintainable, and was 

 not barred by the previous proceedings in the county 

 court (^5). 



Generally speaking, where an injury arises from the 

 misconduct of another, the party who is injured has a 

 right to recover from the injuring party for all the con- 

 sequences of that injury. And it is quite clear that every 

 person who does a wrong is at least responsible for all the 

 mischievous consequences that may reasonably be expected 

 to result, under ordinary circumstances, from such mis- 

 conduct {q). 



A servant, in breach of the Metropolitan Police Act 

 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), s. 54, washed a van in a public street, 

 and allowed the waste water to run down the gutter 

 towards a grating leading to the sewer, about twenty-five 

 yards off. In consequence of the extreme severity of the 

 weather, the grating was obstructed by ice, and the water 

 flowed over a portion of the causeway, which was ill-paved 

 and uneven, and there froze. There was no evidence that 

 the master knew of the grating being obstructed. A horse, 

 while being led past the spot, slipped upon the ice and 

 broke its leg. It was held that this was a consequence 

 too remote to be attributed to the wrongful act of the 

 servant (r). And Bovill, C.J., said, "No doubt, one who 

 commits a wrongful act is responsible for the ordinary 

 consequences which are likely to result therefrom ; but, 

 generally speaking, he is not liable for damage which is 

 not the natural or ordinary consequence of such act, 

 unless it be shown that he knows, or has reasonable means 



[p) Brtmsden v. Humphrey, 14 

 Q. B. D. 141; 53 L. J., Q. B. 476 ; 

 51 L. T., N. S. 529 ; 32 AV. R. 944 

 — C. A. 



(q) RigUj V. Hewitt, 5 Ex. 243. 



(r) Sharp v. Powell, L. E., 7 C. P. 

 253; 41 L. J., C. P. 95; 26 L. T., 

 N. S. 436. 



