FEKOCIOUS AND VICIOUS ANIMALS. 



333 



mises, to be communicated to the husband, was evidence of 

 scienter {t). But the ' converse does not hold good, and a 

 notice to the husband will not, taken alone, be sufficient proof 

 of scienter to render the wife liable after her husband's 

 death (m). 



If the owner of a dog appoints a servant to keep it, the 

 servant's knowledge of the dog's ferocity is the knowledge 

 of the master (v). But notice to an ordinary servant is 

 not sufficient of itself to charge the master, (x) though, if 

 under the circumstances it would be the duty of such 

 servant on becoming aware of the animal's ferocity to 

 inform the master, which in each case is a question for 

 the jury («/), then the fact of the notice to the servant 

 would be some evidence of actual knowledge on the part 

 of the master (2). 



With respect to questions of scienter, there is no differ- 

 ence between a corporation and an individual ; and what- 

 ever is notice to a person competent to receive it is 

 notice to the corporation. Thus, where a passenger by a 

 steam-boat went to the premises of the company to which 

 it belonged, to inquire for his luggage, and while there was 

 bitten by a dog of the company, which had to the know- 

 ledge of persons in their employ (but who had no control 

 over their business or authority with respect to the dog), 

 previously bitten another person ; it was held that, assum- 

 ing the company to be aware of the dangerous nature of 

 the dog, they were liable in damages, but that there was 

 no evidence of a scienter to enable the passenger to main- 

 tain an action (a). It is doubtful whether a promise by 

 the owner of the dog, on being informed of the injury it 

 has done, to make compensation, is evidence of scienter. 

 In Beck v. Dy&on (b) it was held that it was not so. But 

 in Thomas v. Morgan (c) it was held that it was evidence, 

 though of the slightest degree. 



An action may be maintained against a person for Damage done 



damages done to the plaintiff's game by his dog, which g^j^g^J^y^^ 



_„ of action. 



C.J. See also Glevertony. Uffernn, 

 3 Times L. R. 509. 



{z) Applebee v. Fercy, L. E., 9 

 C. P. 647; 43 L. J., C. P. 365; 30 

 L. T., N. S. 785 ; 22 W. E. 704. 



[a] Stiles y. Cardiff Steam Naviga- 

 tion Co., 33 L. J., a. B. 310; 10 

 L. T., N. S. 844 : 12 W. E. 1080. 



[b] 4 Camp. 198; 16 E. E. 774. 



[c] 4 D. P. C. 233. 



[t) Gladman v. Johnson, 36 L. J., 

 C. P. 163. 



[a) Miller V. Kimhray, 16 L. T., 

 N. S. 360. 



(v) Baldwin v. Casella, L. E., 7 

 Ex. 325; 41 L. J., Ex. 167; 26 

 L. T., N. S. 707, 21 W. E. 16. 



[x) Ibid. See also Colyet v. 

 Morris, 2 Times L. E. 471— C. A. 



(j/) Applebee v. Fercy, L. E., 9 

 C. P. at p. 658 — per Lord Coleridge, 



