338 



FEROCIOUS AND VICIOUS ANIMALS. 



Where a 

 vicious beast 

 kills a person. 



Owner bound 

 to secure a 

 vicious animal 

 at all events. 



He is liable 

 to an action 

 for damage. 



The gist of 

 the action. 



Xot necessary 

 to prove 



"When the 

 action will 

 lie. 



to an action in the absence of evidence that he was aware 

 of its propensity to attack passers-by (b). 



If through negligence a vicious beast goes abroad, after 

 warning or notice of his condition, and kills a person, it is 

 the opinion of Hale, that it is manslaughter in the owner (c). 

 And if he purposely let him loose, and wander abroad, with 

 a design to do mischief, even though it were merely to 

 frighten people and make sport, and the beast kills a man, 

 it is murder in the owner (c). 



The owner of a vicious animal, after notice of its having 

 done an injury, is bound to secure it at all events, 

 and is liable in damages to a party subsequently injured, 

 if the mode he has adopted to secure it proves insuffi- 

 cient {d). 



A person who keeps an animal accustomed to attack and 

 bite mankind, with knmvledge that it is so accustomed, is 

 prima facie liable in an action at the suit of any person 

 attacked and injured by such animal (e). 



The gist of the action being the keeping of the animal 

 after knowledge of its mischievous propensities {e) . 



And it is not necessary to prove negligence or default 

 in the securing or taking care of it (e). 



No action lies for an injury done by a fierce dog to a 

 person trespassing on the owner's premises (/) ; or in- 

 cautiously entering them by night, knowing the dog to be 

 let loose for the protection of the premises {g). But 

 though a person has a right to keep a fierce dog to protect 

 his property, he must not place it in the open approaches 

 to his house, so as to injure persons lawfully coming 

 there {h). If the person injured has no means of knowing 

 the danger, and is not otherwise in fault, he may recover, 

 although the owner has attempted to give notice, and it is, 

 therefore, no answer to such an action, that a printed 

 notice was put up, if it appears that the plaintiff could not 

 read (*') ; and it is immaterial that he has, on a previous 



[h) Jaehson v. Smitlison, 15 M. & 

 \V. 563. 



(c) See judgment — Sex v. Suggins, 

 2 Ld. Eaym. 1583, cited May v. 

 Burdett, 9 Q. B. 107. But not so if 

 the owner can show that he tm-ned 

 the beast out in self-preservation 

 — per Bramwell, B., iicfj'. v. Child, 

 C. C. C. Feb. 4, 1858. 



(rf) Blaekman v. Simmons, 3 C. & 

 P. 138. 



(c) May V. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101. 



See also Besozzi v. Sarris, 1 F. & F. 

 92, ante, p. 329. See also Fletcher 

 V. Rijlands, L. K., 1 Ex. 265, 281. 



(/) Sareh v. BlaeUuni, M. & M. 

 .505; 4 C.&P. 297. 



((?) Brock y. Copchmd, 1 Esp. 203; 

 5 R. E. 730 ; Deane v. Clayton, 1 

 B. Moo. 225, 245. 



(/i) Smch V. Blackburn, M. & M. 

 505— per Tindal, C.J. 



(i) Ibid., M. & M. 605 ; 4 C. & P. 

 297. 



