STEWARDS. 



385 



by showing tliat Shaw's horse was thorough-hred and that 

 his own was not " (e). 



The decision of the stewards is not invalidated by the 

 fact of one of them being interested in the decision, inas- 

 much as it does not appear to be in the contemplation of 

 the parties, that they should be excluded on that ground, 

 nor are they arbitrators in the strict legal sense (/), the 

 intention of the parties being to constitute a tribunal for 

 the termination of any dispute without litigation of any 

 kind either by arbitration or action, and therefore the 

 principle of law as to interested judges is not applicable 

 to them. 



Thus in the case of Ellis v. Hopper {g), where a steeple- 

 chase was run according to certain rules and conditions, 

 one of which was that all disputes should be settled by the 

 stewards, whose decision was to be final, it was held that 

 the fact that one of the stewards joined in the award, where 

 the winning or not of his own horse was in question, did not 

 render the award void. And Bramwell, B., said in his 

 judgment, " If in the betting code no such implied condition 

 exist, that the appointed arbitrators or judges shall cease to 

 be empowered to act, if one of them becomes interested in 

 the event ; the only remaining question is, is there a general 

 proposition of law, that whenever a matter is referred to one 

 or several persons his or their powers shall cease, if one 

 of them becomes interested in the event ? I know of no 

 such rule. When parties agree to refer a matter, they 

 may, if they please, put in a condition to that effect ; but if 

 they do not, why should the law make such a condition for 

 them." 



It appears to be at present undecided whether, on one of 

 the stewards becoming disqualified, the tribunal would still 

 be in its integrity {h) . But it has been held that a de- 

 cision made by two of the stewards, three having been 

 appointed, was valid and binding, although it was made in 

 the absence of the third steward, and although he dissented 

 from that decision (?). 



In the case of Parr v. Winteringham (i), Lord Campbell, 

 C. J., thus defined the position of stewards : — " If stewards 



(e) Marryat v. Broderiolc, 2 M. & 

 W. 369. 



(/) Sllis v. Hopper, 4 Jur., 

 N. S. 1025; 28 L. J., Ex.1; Parr 

 T. Winteringham, 28 L. J., U. B. 

 123. 



O. 



Legal position 

 of stewards. 



(g) Ellis V. Hopper, i Jur., N. S. 

 1025; 28 L. J., Ex. 1. 



(A) Ibid. 



(i) Farr v. Winteringham, 5 Jur. 

 N". S. 787 ; 28 L. J., Q. B. 123. 



C C 



Decision not 

 necessarily 

 iuyalidated 

 by one of 

 them being 

 interested. 



Decision 

 of two out 

 of three 

 stewards held 

 binding. 



Stewards 

 differ from 

 legal arbi- 

 trators. 



