390 EACING, STAKEHOLDERS AND STEWARDS. 



Decision of Where by the conditions of a race the decision of the 



ihe "^pire or ^jjjpjj.g qj committee is to be final, the parties are bound 



by it in the same way as in the case of stewards. Thus 



where a match was made between two mares under the 



following agreement : — 



" Pkatt and Evans. 



" Thomas Holyoake, Esq., Umpire. 



" Frederick Pratt bets Thomas Evans 100/. to 25/. p.p. 

 \j)lay or pay], Mr. Ryley's brown mare, [late his property] 

 beats Thomas Evans's mare, Matilda, four miles across a 

 country, thirteen stone each. To come off 1st March, 1841. 

 The umpired decision to he final. 



(Signed) " Thomas Evans, 



" FiiEDEEiCK Pratt." 



The match came off on the day appointed. Mr. Ryley's 

 brown mare came in first ; but Mr. Holyoake, the umpire, 

 decided that the other mare was the winner, in consequence 

 of the former having passed through a gateway instead 

 of going over the hedge, which the rules of steeplechas- 

 ing seem to require. It was held that it was not com- 

 petent to either party to dispute the decision of the umpire, 

 as they had constituted him judge of the law and the 

 fact {q). 



Also where a race was run, subject to certain con- 

 ditions, one of which was, that the riders should be " gen- 

 tlemen farmers, or tradesmen, being persons never having 

 ridden as regular joclieys or paid riders." Another, that 

 the decision of the committee on any dispute that might 

 arise should be final. At the trial it appeared that the 

 rider of the plaintiff's horse, which came first to the win- 

 ning chair, had been in the habit of riding at races, 

 sometimes receiving his expenses, but never having been paid 

 for his services, and that the plaintiff's right to the stakes 

 was disputed on the ground of an alleged cross. Imme- 

 diately after the race, the jockey was required to attend 

 before the committee, but omitted to do so. The com- 

 mittee therefore entered upon the inquiry, and ultimately 

 came to the resolution, that unless the plaintiff would pro- 

 duce evidence before them on the following morning to 

 induce them to alter their minds, their decision was that 



(q) Emns T. Pratt, 4 Scott, N. R. 378. 



