408 



WAGERS. 



Action ty 

 jobber against 

 principal. 

 Grizewood T. 



A real time bargain appears to be of very rare occur- 

 rence («), if not entirely unknown (y) on the Stock Exchange. 

 "Butwhat are called time bargains," said Lindley, J. in de- 

 livering judgment in TJiaclievY. Hardy (2), " are, in fact, the 

 result of two distinct and perfectly legal bargains, namely, 

 first, a bargain to buy or sell ; and, secondly, a subsequent 

 bargain that the first shall not be carried out ; and it is 

 only when the first bargain is entered into upon the under- 

 standing that it is not to be carried out, that a time bargain, 

 in the sense of an unenforceable bargain, is entered into." 



A time bargain is not necessarily invalid, as in the case 

 of a contract to sell next year's apple crop in a particular 

 orchard (a), where the parties may be respectively gainers 

 or losers, according to the happening of a future event, but 

 one of the essential elements of a wagering contract is 

 wanting (J). 



Grizewood v. Blane (c), affords an instance of a real time 

 bargain {d). In that case, the declaration alleged a contract 

 for the sale by the defendant to the plaintiif of railway 

 shares at a certain price, and a subsequent contract for the 

 sale by the plaintiff to the defendant of other railway shares 

 at an advanced price, and an agreement that the two sets 

 of shares should be set oif against each other, and the 

 differences paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. At the 

 trial, it appeared that the plaintiff was a stockjobber and 

 that the defendant had, through his broker, contracted to 

 seU and to re-purchase the shares mentioned in the declara- 

 tion ; and that there had been former dealings between the 

 parties of the same character, no shares passing, but merely 

 settlements of differences. It was objected on behalf of the 

 defendant, that, it being evident that the sales were a mere 

 colour for payment and receipt of differences one way or 

 the other, the contract was one by way of gaming and 

 wagering within the meaning of the statute. Jervis, C.J. 

 left it to the jury to say what was the intention of the 

 parties at the time of making the contract — whether either 

 party really meant to purchase or to sell the shares in 

 question ; telling them that if they did not, the contract 

 was, in his opinion, a gambling transaction and void. 



[x) Thacl-er v. Sardij, i Q. B. D. 

 at p. 689 — per Lindley, J. 



(y) Ex parte Grant, 13 Cb. D. at 

 p. 671. 



(z) 4 Q. B. D. at p. 689. 



(«) Thnclcer v. Eardii, 4 Q. B. D. 



at p. 692 — per Bramwell, L.J'. 



(b) Ibid, at p. 696— per Cotton, 



(c) 11 C. B. 626. 



(d) See Thacker v. Bardtj, i Q. 

 B. D. at p. 689— per Lindley, J. 



