LIFE AND CHANCE 



as we choose to regard it — chance as being void of 

 thought or purpose and fate as being in the grip of 

 immutable laws. 



The law of chance and of probability is competent 

 to account for all the particular forms which bodies 

 assume in inorganic natiu-e — a natm-al bridge, a 

 profile in the rocks, obelisks, architectural forms, 

 brought out by erosion, etc.; but can it account 

 for the forms of living thiugs? The forms of hving 

 things are purposeful; the forms of non-hving things 

 serve no purpose, there is no particular end to be 

 served by them. The forms of crystals are not hap- 

 hazard, they are predetermined, and yet they serve 

 no purpose. The exquisite and mathematical forms 

 of the snowflakes serve no purpose; such things are 

 the result of a particular activity in matter, and 

 seem in some way to bridge the gulf between the 

 organic and the inorganic. Chemical activity fore- 

 shadows vital actiAdty, and is the parent of it. 

 Though life arises out of chemical reactions, yet a 

 philosophy of life expressed in terms of chemical 

 reactions is barren or unsatisfactory. 



Can the ocean tides be defined and accounted for 

 in terms of the mobility of water? The water in the 

 pond has the same mobility, but it has no tide. 

 To account for the tides we must look beyond the 

 mere fluidity of water, though without this fluidity 

 there would be no tides. No more can life be de- 

 fined and accounted for in terms of its chemical and 

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