MECHANICAL VIEWS OF KANT AND LAPLACE 201 



substances, and which are called Kfe, in the usual sense of the word. The old idea of spontaneous generation is 

 now taken in many different senses. I (Haeckel) restrict it to the first development of hving protoplasm out of 

 inorganic carbonates, and distinguish two phases in this beginning of biogenesis : (1) autoguny, or the rise of the 

 simplest protoplasmic substances in a formative fluid, and (2) plasmogony, the differentiation of individual primitive 

 organisms out of these protoplasmic compounds in the form of monera. . . . Since Darwin gave us the key to the 

 monistic explanation of organisation in his theory of ' selection ' forty years ago, it has become possible for us to 

 trace the splendid variety of orderly tendencies of the organic world to mechanical, natural causes." 



§ 34. Mechanical Views of Kant and Laplace as Interpreted by Haeckel. 



Haeckel continuing adds : " Since Newton (1682) formulated the law of gravitation, and Kant (1755) established 

 'the constitution and mechanical origin of the entire fabric of the world on Newtonian laws,' and Laplace (1796) 

 provided a mathematical foundation for this law of cosmic mechanism, the whole of the inorganic sciences have 

 become purely mechanical, and at the same time purely atheistic. Astronomy, cosmogony, geology, meteorology, 

 and inorganic physics and chemistry are now absolutely ruled by mechanical laws on a mathematical foundation. 

 The idea of ' design ' has wholly disappeared from this vast province of science. The anthropomorphic notion 

 of a deliberate architect and ruler of the world has gone for ever from this field ; the eternal, iron laws of ' nature ' 

 have taken his place. 



" But the idea of design has a very great significance and application in the organic world. We do undeniably 

 perceive a purpose in the structure and in the life of an organism. The plant and the animal seem to be controlled 

 by a definite design in the combination of their several parts, just as clearly as we see in the machines which man 

 invents and constructs ; as long as hfe continues the functions of the several organs are directed to definite ends, 

 just as is the operation of the various parts of a machine. Hence it was quite natural that the older naive study 

 of nature, in explaining the origin and activity of the living being, should postulate a creator who had ' arranged 

 all things with wisdom and understanding,' and had constructed each plant and animal according to the special 

 purpose of its life. The conception of this ' almighty creator of heaven and earth ' was usually quite anthro- 

 pomorphic ; he created ' everything after its kind.' As long as the creator seemed to man to be of human 

 shape, to think with his brain, see with his eyes, and fashion with his hand, it was possible to form a definite 

 picture of this ' divine engineer ' and his artistic work in the great workshop of creation. This was not so 

 easy when the idea of God became refined, and man saw in his ' invisible God ' a creator without organs — a 

 gaseous being. Still more unintelligible did these anthropomorphic ideas become when physiology substituted 

 for the conscious, divine architect " an unconscious, creative vital force ' — a mysterious, purposive, natural force, 

 which differed from the familiar forces of physics and chemistry, and only took these in part, during life, into its 

 service. . . . 



" Nowhere in the evolution of animals and plants do we find any trace of design, but merely the inevitable 

 outcome of the struggle for existence, the bUnd controller, instead of the provident God, that effects the changes 

 of organic forms by a mutual action of the laws of heredity and adaptation. And there is no more trace of 

 ' design ' in the embryology of the individual plant, animal, or man. Throughout the whole of astronomy, 

 geology, physics, and chemistry there is no question to-day of a ' moral order ' or a personal God, whose ' hand 

 hath disposed all things in wisdom and understanding.' And the same must be said of the entire field of biology, 

 the whole constitution and history of organic nature, if we set aside the question of man for the moment. Darwin 

 has not only proved by his theory of selection that the orderly processes in the hfe and structure of animals and 

 plants have arisen by mechanical laws without any preconceived design, but he has shown us 'in the struggle 

 for Hfe ' the powerful natural force which has exerted supreme control over the entire course of organic evolution 

 for milhons of years. . . . The anthropomorphic character of this notion, generally closely connected with belief in a 

 personal God, is quite obvious. Behef in a ' loving Father' who unceasingly guides the destinies of 1,500,000,000 

 men on our planet, and is attentive at all times to their millions of contradictory prayers and pious wishes, is 

 absolutely impossible ; that is at once perceived on laying aside the coloured spectacles of faith, and reflecting 

 rationally on the subject. Since impartial study of the evolution of the world teaches us that there is no definite 

 aim and no special purpose to be traced in it, there seems to be no alternative but to leave everything to blind 

 chance. The development of the universe is a monistic, mechanical process, in which we discover no aim or pur- 

 pose whatever ; what we call design in the organic world is a special result of biological agencies ; neither in the 

 evolution of the heavenly bodies nor in that of the crust of our earth do we find any trace of a controlhng purpose 

 — all is the result of chance." 



The foregoing quotations fairly and fully express the views of Haeckel, and of Darwin as interpreted by 

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