NERVE REFLEXES IN ANIMALS 267 



taneous intrinsic molecular changes in the brain and nerves, which materially differ from the changes produced 

 by the crude, artificial stimuli of the modern, mechanical school of physiology. Volitions, strictly speaking, are 

 traceable to living, sentient, conscious matter asserting itself directly by means of its nerves, muscles, and other 

 structures placed at its disposal by the First Cause to accomplish certain ends. Vohtions are spontaneous, inde- 

 pendent acts. They require no prompting, no motive, and least of all any extraneous stimulation or external jogging. 



The mind, according to the majority of psychologists, is at liberty to act as it please. Those who espouse the 

 doctrine of " Free Will " maintain that they can do what they like in their own way and at their own time. I'hey 

 are not obUged to act in obedience to certain movements and motives which they can altogether ignore and disregard. 

 The doctrine of " Free Will " has been challenged by those who advocate the doctrine of " Necessity," and who are 

 known as " Necessitarians." 



The Necessitarians assert that as everything in the universe is under law and order and conditioned, so the 

 operations of the mind are not free, but are hmited and pre-determined, and that intellectual man, in common with 

 everything, organic and inorganic, can only perform a certain rule. The Necessitarians have certain facts and 

 analogies in their favour, but it cannot be denied that deep in man's nature a something pleads strongly for the 

 recognition and exercise of Free Will. 



An attempt has been made to reconcile the opposing doctrines by falling back on the omniscience of the 

 Creator, Who has made everything that is made, and Who knows everything which has happened, is happening, 

 or can happen. To such a being there can be no such thing as " Free Will " and " Necessity " in the sense in which 

 these terms are commonly employed. Free Will and Necessity are human conceptions, and apply to hmited intelh- 

 gences. The mind, while apparently free in the opinion of certain individuals, is nevertheless under restraints 

 which rob it of much of its supposed hberty of action. Man, in exercising his intellect, as he thinks independently, 

 has behind him an inscrutable power which unerringly guides him in spite of himself to do some things and leave 

 others undone. The exercise of his intellect is not wholly under his control. To the prescient mind, the doctrines 

 of Free Will and Necessity are not altogether incompatible. If certain things are fated to occur they will occur, 

 Free Will and Necessity notwithstanding. The theologians have had much to do with bringing the doctrines of 

 Free Will and Necessity into prominence, for, say they, if all our actions are pre-determined we are not responsible 

 agents, and cannot be punished for doing what we could not avoid doing. There is no place for either punishment 

 or reward under such circumstances. On the other hand, if we are free to act as we please, and to do or leave undone 

 certain acts, then and then only does man become a responsible agent. He is then a fitting subject for both 

 punishment and reward. The subjects of Free Will and Necessity do not, strictly speaking, fall within the scope 

 of the present work, and need not be further discussed. 



If a part of a plant or animal dies or is lopped off, hj so much is the hfe of the plant and animal impaired, 

 and its usefulness dinainished. It is not permissible, even in the highest animals, to speak of any structure or 

 function exclusively by itself. Every part of a hving animal is essential to its integrity and well-being. This is 

 true even of the extra-vascular tissues, epidermis, hairs, nails, horns, hoofs, &c. The parts of the most highly 

 differentiated plants and animals are aU united structurally and functionally, and it is never quite safe to isolate 

 either structure or function. From the beginning it is so. In the embryo of plants and animals there is com- 

 munity of structure and function : development and growth necessitate this. Whatever differentiation occurs later 

 on in the shape of special organs does not destroy the community of structure and function in the widest sense : 

 it merely adds variety. Division of labour in an organism does not alter the fundamental nature of labour. Thus 

 protoplasm and muscle are both endowed with centripetal and centrifugal movements, and plants and animals 

 (without and with nerves) feel. Movement and feehng are fundamental endowments, and extend to both plants 

 and animals ; and the fact that movement and feeling are more locahsed and emphasised in animals than in plants, 

 and in the higher forms of both, does not abrogate the prerogatives common to all. It is on this common ground 

 of structure and function that the lower and higher forms of plants and animals meet, for it cannot be maintained 

 that the higher plants are better adapted for the work they are called upon to perform than the lower ones, or that 

 animals are better equipped for the role they have to play than plants. Each hving plant and animal is to be 

 regarded as perfect within its sphere ; the Designer and the designed cannot be separated from each other, and error 

 cannot consistently be attributed to the Deity or Great First Cause. 



In order to keep this inorganic kingdom going, plants and animals are of necessity endowed with the power of 

 moving in whole and in part. 



Desmids, and the young of many plants, move freely about in water for the most part by the aid of vibratile 

 processes or cilia, and all plants circulate their nutritious juices. Some plants, moreover, such as the Sensitive 

 and Insectivorous ones, move in parts and to given ends. They also feel. Animals one and all are endowed with 

 the power of moving. This is true of the amoeba, and all intermediate animals, up to man. Movements are of 



