460 Evolution and Modern Philosophy 
It was, then, not entirely a foreign point of view which Darwin 
introduced into ethical thought, even if we take no account of the 
poetical character of the word “struggle” and of the more direct 
adaptation, through the use and non-use of power, which Darwin also 
emphasised. In The Descent of Man he has devoted a special 
chapter’ to a discussion of the origin of the ethical consciousness. 
The characteristic expression of this consciousness he found, just as 
Kant did, in the idea of “ought” ; it was the origin of this new idea 
which should be explained. His hypothesis was that the ethical 
“ought.” has its origin in the social and parental instincts, which, as 
well as other instincts (eg. the instinct of self-preservation), lie 
deeper than pleasure and pain. In many species, not least in the 
human species, these instincts are fostered by natural selection ; and 
when the powers of memory and comparison are developed, so that 
single acts can be valued according to the claims of the deep social 
instinct, then consciousness of duty and remorse are possible. Blind 
instinct has developed to conscious ethical will. 
As already stated, Darwin, as a moral philosopher belongs to the 
school that was founded by Shaftesbury, and was afterwards repre- 
sented by Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, Comte and Spencer. His 
merit is, first, that he has given this tendency of thought a biological 
foundation, and that he has stamped on it a doughty character 
in showing that ethical ideas and sentiments, rightly conceived, are 
forces which are at work in the struggle for life. 
There are still many questions to solve. Not only does the 
ethical development within the human species contain features still 
unexplained? ; but we are confronted by the great problem whether 
after all a genetic historical theory can be of decisive importance 
here. To every consequent ethical consciousness there is a standard 
of value, a primordial value which determines the single ethical 
judgments as their last presupposition, and the “rightness” of this 
basis, the “value” of this value can as little be discussed as the 
“rationality” of our logical principles. There is here revealed a 
possibility of ethical scepticism which evolutionistic ethics (as well 
as intuitive or rationalistic ethics) has overlooked. No demonstra- 
tion can show that the results of the ethical development are 
definitive and universal. We meet here again with the important 
opposition of systematisation and evolution. There will, I think, 
always be an open question here, though comparative ethics, of which 
we have so far only the first attempts, can do much to throw light 
on it. 
It would carry us too far to discuss all the philosophical works on 
ethics, which have been influenced directly or indirectly by evolu- 
1 The Descent of Man, Vol. t. Ch. iii. 
2 The works of Westermarck and Hobhouse throw new light on many of these features. 
