35 
He submils, in defence of his views, that “if the miracle be a creden- 
tial, whether that feature of it is rightly or wrongly included in the 
definition, the use of that fact to prove that creation, in the first in- 
stance, was not a miracle, is relevant.” To this astounding statement 
the reply is obvious. If ‘‘credential’”’ be an essential element of ‘‘miracle,”’ 
then it could not “rightly” be omitted from the definition. If, however, 
it be not essential, then it could not otherwise than “wrongly” be in- 
cluded in the definition. The nclusion of it in the first instance would 
be necessary to render the definition adequate; the exclusion of it in 
the second instance would be necessary to save the definition from ‘‘re- 
dundancy.”” The fallacy here is in holding, as the “Keply” says, “that 
evidential is essential to the miracle and not accidental,” and yet sup- 
posing, for a single moment, that it could be “wrongly” included in the 
“definition.” If it is “essential,” it must be included; if it is ‘“acci- 
dental,” it »ust not beincluded. The fallacy, in the next place, consists 
in supposing that in determining whether any given event—crection ex 
nihilo, e. g.—is, or is nota “miracle,” you may test the claims of that 
event with equal relevancy by the ‘‘redundant’’ element of the definition, 
as by that element which is not redundant; 7. e., the ‘‘accidental’”’ is just 
as good a test of the “whether or not?” asisthe “essential.” The ‘‘re- 
dundant definition” is just as good a test of truth as is the purely and 
severely “adequate definition.” That which is ‘‘wrongly” included in 
a definition, serves just as well for ‘testing’ purposes as that which is 
“rightly” included. Or, to put it a little differently, so as to obviate any 
objection from the Doctor: If the critic insists that ‘‘evidential” in the 
“definition” renders it ‘‘redundant,” then I will put “evidential” outside 
of the “definition.” Then I will test whether or not creation ex nihilo 
is a miracle, first by the definition, and, if it passes that test, I shall 
then cry, ‘‘ Halt!’ and proceed to test it by that which is not in the 
“definition ;” and if it shall fail to pass that test, then I will reject it 
from the category of “miracle ;” for “I hold that evidential is essential 
to the miracle and not accidental,” 7. ¢., ‘ntrinsic and not extrinsic. But 
why then, Doctor, do you consent to put it outside of the definition, 
and then apply the definition as if evidential were inside, and not outside, 
just as if you had not consented? Why “grant,” and then “apply” 
as if you had not granted? In this apparent “grant for argument’s 
sake,” you very shrewdly beg the question. 
Credenticl though not belonging to the essence is a concomitant—or 
circumstance—of some miracles ; but this can give no base for arguing that 
creation ex nihilo cannot be a miracle because not wrought for eviden- 
