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tial purposes. This argument could be used only after it has been proven 
that “evidential” is essential and intrinsic of all miracles—not of some 
only (and that the “evidential” effect must operate in the very moment 
when the miracle is performed, and not afterwards only; this rule, of 
course, would render the resurrection of Christ no miracle) ; whereas the 
Doctor has not proven, and is not likely to prove, that it is intrinsic of 
even a single miracle, how much less then of all? Dr. Girardeau’s 
hypothetical proposition, therefore, is absurd: “(Jf the miracle [7. e., 
some miracle] be evidential [whether essentially so or accidentally 
so], then that feature, whether rightly or wrongly included in the 
definition, may be relevantly used to prove that creation ex nihilo in 
the first instance, is not a miracle; because creation in the first instance 
is not evidential.” The fallacy here is very patent: In the first place, 
he concludes from a particular premise, as if it had been universal; in 
the next place, he concludes from specially modified premises as if those 
special modifications had been omitted: ¢. g., the premise is (seeing it 
is “‘some”’ miracle) ‘‘whether essential or accidental,” but the conclusion 
is drawn as if the “or accidental” had been omitted from the premise ; 
again, é. g., the premise is—‘“whether rightly or wrongly included,” 
but the conclusion is drawn as if the “or wrongly” had been omitted 
from the premise. Let us exhibit the Doctor’s argument in its naked 
deformity: “Jf some miracle be accidentally evidential, then that fea- 
ture, although wrongly included in the definition, may be relevantly 
used as a test; But, according to this test, creation ex nihilo is not a 
miracle; because it lacks evidential, which is an essential feature of all 
miracle, and is therefore rightly included in the definition.” 
How can that which is not essential to the being of a thing be rele- 
vantly used in argument as if it were essential? How can that which 
is essential be relevantly used in argument as if it were not essential ? 
Evidential (or credential) as a quality of the miracle is just as good in 
argument whether that quality is “rightly or wrongly included in the 
definition,” 7. ¢., an inadequate definition, or a redundant definition, is no 
whit better in argument than an adequate definition: in the matter of 
“aroument,” so far as “definition” may be concerned, “inadequate” and 
“redundant,” “correct” and “incorrect,” are obsolete terms! In the 
name of Logic, why then should the logician be at all careful in defin- 
ing his terms? or why should all sound reasoning insist upon accuracy 
of definition? Suppose, then, an argument of this kind by way of illus- 
tration: This ‘“‘fact” (stabbing, ¢. g., with a knife) is not essential to that 
killing which is murder; but is sometimes a circumstance of that killing 
