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sion.” For my criticism was not that the miracle is not “contra-nat- 
ural,” therefore your argument is invalid; but, notwithstanding it be 
true that the miracle 7s “‘contranatural,”’ yet still your argument is not 
valid. My point was, your argument refutes itself, by proving too much ; 
and this was done upon your own base, viz., that “creation begins the 
order of nature.” 
It seems, then, that creation ex nihilo in the second instance is a 
miracle, and that the resurrection of Lazarus is one of this class; and 
that creation from nothing in the first instance is not a miracle. What, 
then, constitutes the difference between the “first”’ instance and the ‘“‘sec- 
ond’? Wherein do they intrinsically (not circumstantially or contin- 
gently) differ, so that the one is a miracle, and the other “cannot be” ? 
This difference, whatever it is, would be at last the essence of miracle: 
According to the Doctor it would be not the ‘notion,’ but the presence, 
of ‘secondary causes,” i. é., nature in a position contra, 7. é., at last the 
essence of miracle is presence of nature as contra, 1. ¢., the inner essence 
of a thing is a contingent external circumstance ; i. ¢., the accident is 
the essence. But even judged by this criterion, it is doubtful whether 
Lazarus’s resurrection was a miracle; for, whence came that animal life 
of Lazarus at the time of the first quickening of his body? If ex nihilo, 
then there is absolutely no difference between the first quickening and 
the second quickening of his body. If not ea nihilo in the first quick- 
ening, then it is still less necessary to suppose it was ex nihilo in the 
second; for having been once brought into existence, we know of no in- 
stance of annihilation ; and therefore this radical difference between the 
first and the second, would be lacking: Lazarus’s resurrection would not 
therefore be an example of ex nihilo in the second instance; it (so far 
as the restoration of his ‘animal life” is concerned) would lack therefore 
the contra natural element as compared with the first: 7. ¢., neither of 
them would be ex nihilo; 7. e., both would be not ex nihilo; 7. ¢., 
the first and the second quickening would be reduced to the same level; 
and as the first was no miracle, so the second was none; though the first 
was natural and the second was contra-natural! This burden is surely 
too heavy for the Doctor’s “‘theory’’—it crushes the life out of it. 
2. The “Reply” is very positive in the second step of his defence: 
“Manifestly, if the miracle be contranatural, there could have been no 
nature to be contradicted” in exnihilation in “absolutely the first in- 
stance ;” therefore, creation from nothing in the first instance “cannot 
be a miracle.” But the “manifestly” strikes us as just the other way; 
for of all the most “contra” natural things—‘“creation from nothing in 
