60 
Take the definition of justification. The proximate genus is “act of 
God’s free grace.” But adoption belongs to the same genus. How is 
justification to be distinguished from adoption? By the specific differ- 
ence. Now, that consists of “a number of specific marks: (1) Pardon; 
(2) acceptance of the person as righteous; (3) imputation of Christ’s 
righteousness; (4) reception of Christ’s righteousness by faith alone. 
In this definition, which is clear, distinct, and adequate, you have in the 
proximate genus the nature, in the specific difference the office, the 
ground, the mode, the instrument; and, besides, the office of the instru- 
ment. 
I need pursue this analysis of the Shorter Catechism definitions no 
further. Tne same will be found true, to a greater or less extent, of the 
definition of the work of creation, of the works of providence, of sin, of 
effectual calling, of sanctification, of repentance, of prayer, and of a sacra- 
ment. They all involve more than one specific mark in the specific dif- 
ference. Now let Dr. Martin go and triumphantly flourish his inexor- 
able rule, which I have so ignorantly violated, over the wreck of the 
Shorter Catechism which its application would make. 
Hold! It will be said, these are not definitions proper. To this I 
answer: Logicians divide definition into two kinds—the narrower (an- 
gustior) and the wider (latior). Of course, then, the wide are defini- 
tions as well as the narrow. For definition would be the proximate 
genus, including under it the two species, narrow and wide. Now, in 
giving my definition of a miracle, I did not say that I was furnishing a 
narrow definition. I may have had the benefit given me of the supposi- 
tion that I intended to use the wide, even if the ctitic held that it could 
not be the narrow. Why this vehement onslaught? Why the applica- 
tion to my definition of a rule applicable only to some particular kind of 
definition? Why, when the definition contained fewer specific marks 
than some of those in the Shorter Catechism? The critic has “‘o’er- 
vaulted himself.” In his eager attempt to break down my argument, he 
has torn the Shorter Catechism to shreds. Calvinists have been wont 
to regard its definitions as excellent, whether they may be assigned to 
one kind or another, narrow or wide, but the same rule by which he 
would destroy mine would destroy them. 
But is Dr. Martin quite sure that the narrow or strict definition lim- 
its the specific difference to one specific mark? The question is not, 
whether if one specific mark renders the definition adequate, one only 
ought to be inserted. That is admitted. But it is, whether one specific 
mark in all cases renders the definition adequate. Porphyry, in his cele- 
