THE DOG AND THE LAW. 
dog.” The inevitable result of such 
treatment was that the dog, which was 
admitted to be of a nervous disposition, 
either jumped or was knocked overboard, 
and was seen swimming in the sea astern 
of the ship, and, though every effort was 
made to recover it, was lost. 
The defendants in their defence alleged 
that they had not been guilty of any negli- 
gence, and alternatively relied on the terms 
of the bill of lading quoted above. The 
learned judge apparently found that the 
letting of the dog loose was negligence on the 
part of the defendants’ servants, but he said 
the point was of no importance, as in any 
event, owing to the terms of the bill of lading, 
the defendants could not be held liable, for 
it was expressly agreed that the dog was 
shipped on deck solely at shipper’s risk, and 
that the defendants were not to be liable 
for any negligence of anyof their servants, etc. 
Dealing first with this part of the case, the 
writer, despite the well-known ability of 
the judge in this particular class of case 
especially, has always been of opinion, of 
course with great deference, that at any rate 
with regard to this point the judgment was 
appealable. It was not the Collies that 
were shipped on deck at shipper’s risk, but 
it was the Collies in a double kennel, and 
this was so stated in the bill of lading. 
The matter that could only be in the minds 
of the parties at the time the agreement was 
made is alone the matter governed by it, 
Had the Collies, kennel and all, gone over- 
board, the plaintiff clearly had no case, 
even although the kennel had been knocked 
overboard in consequence of gross negligence 
on the part of the defendants or their 
servants. Collars and chains were provided 
for the proper exercise of the dogs, and they 
could therefore easily, for the purposes of 
health and cleanliness, have been tied up 
somewhere in security, even to the kennel 
571 
itself, or been led about, and the high rate 
charged for their conveyance seems to 
imply that some care and trouble would be 
taken. The plaintiff can never possibly 
have contemplated that the ship’s people 
would be so foolish as to let his dog run 
about loose, especially when he had pro- 
vided sufficient means for its proper exercise. 
Let us suppose a person ships a number of 
golden balls in a box to be carried on deck 
at shipper’s risk under a similar bill of 
lading ; it is essential the balls must have 
air, and therefore for this purpose the box 
has affixed to it a wire-netting lid. Let us 
further suppose some person in the employ 
of the ship thinks it proper to turn the balls 
loose on the deck for the purpose of airing 
them, otherwise than by the wire lid. 
The balls, of course, at once roll overboard— 
and they are not one bit more likely to do 
this than the dog was, in the above-mentioned 
case. Can it be said that the shipowner in 
such case is not liable ? has he not acted right 
outside the contract altogether, and done 
something which can never have been in 
the contemplation of the parties at the 
time the contract was made, and which, 
therefore, cannot be covered by its terms ? 
However this may be, the case quoted did 
not go higher ; it is quite possible other 
difficulties stood in the way, such as, for 
instance, that further clause in the bill of 
lading about notice of any claim having 
to be given at the port of delivery within 
seven days from the completion of the 
ship’s discharge, which, maybe, had not 
been complied with. 
The shipowner has invariably in such 
cases more than one string to his bow, and 
is a troublesome customer to tackle. The 
law rightly or wrongly allows him to protect 
himself so fully that, as has been said, as a 
general rule dog owners will find he is best 
left alone. 
