ACTIONS AT LAW. 241 



The learned counsel, Mr. Philbrick, remarked that he 

 must have had but little time to indulge in his habit of 

 wind-sucking if continually going thirty-five miles a 

 day. 



The court adjourned. 



The following day Mr. FuUerton, in the absence of his 

 learned colleague, addressed the jury for the defendant, 

 calling their attention to the importance of the case to the 

 latter, who had been charged with fraudulent practices — 

 in appl5dng elastic apparatus to the animal's natural lop- 

 ears, the bishoping of the teeth, as well as representing the 

 animal as sound knowing it to be unsound. He admitted 

 that the animal was a wind-sucker— a patent defect, or 

 vice — and which the evidence of the professional witnesses 

 went to show was not an unsoundness. The evidence in 

 general was most forcibly laid before the jury, and he 

 begged them to well weigh the position of defendant. 



Mr. Philbrick, on behalf of the plaintiff, said that, with 

 reference to the ears and teeth, or misrepresentation con- 

 nected therewith, he would pass that over, and confine 

 himself to facts. The questions he submitted to the jury 

 were : Did the defendant warrant the horse sound ? 

 And was the horse unsound ? With reference to what was 

 soundness and unsoundness, his lordship had already 

 explained this, and he could not add thereto. With 

 reference to the warranty, there was the letter before 

 them, and the cheque endorsed ; there was the admission 

 of defendant that he said the horse was " workably sound," 

 ■ and his lordship had explained that a sound horse must 

 of necessity be workable— indeed, the question they 

 had to decide was this : Was the horse a " wind-sucker " ? 

 This was admitted. Then, was this an unsoundness or 

 a vice ? There was no doubt that the opinion of the pro- 

 fessional men who had been heard was formed after due 

 consideration. 



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