Translation from Von Hartmann 99 



flat lids usual for this kind of larva, and not with the round 

 ones that are proper for drones. In autumn, as a general 

 rule, bees kill their drones, but they refrain from doing 

 this when they have lost their queen, and keep them to 

 fertilise the young queen, who will be developed from 

 larvse that would otherwise have become working bees. 

 Huber observed that they defend the entrance of their 

 hive against the inroads of the sphinx moth by means 

 of skilful constructions made of wax and propolis. They 

 only introduce propolis when they want it for the execu- 

 tion of repairs, or for some other special purpose. Spiders 

 and caterpillars also display marvellous dexterity in the 

 repair of their webs if they have been damaged, and this 

 requires powers perfectly distinct from those requisite 

 for the construction of a new one. 



The above examples might be multiplied indefinitely, 

 but they are sufficient to estabhsh the fact that instincts 

 are not capacities rolled, as it were, off a reel mechanically, 

 according to an invariable system, but that they adapt 

 themselves most closely to the circumstances of each case, 

 and are capable of such great modification and variation 

 that at times they almost appear to cease to be instinctive. 



Many will, indeed, ascribe these modifications to con- 

 scious deliberation on the part of the animals themselves, 

 and it is impossible to deny that in the case of the more 

 intellectually gifted animals there may be such a thing as 

 a combination of instinctive faculty and conscious re- 

 flection. I think, however, the examples already cited 

 are enough to show that often where the normal and the 

 abnormal action springs from the same source, without 

 any complication with conscious deliberation, they are 

 either both instinctive or both deliberative.^ Or is that 



1 " Indessen glaube ich, dass die angefiihrten Beispiele zur 

 Geniige beweisen, dass es auch viele Falle giebt, wo ohne jede Com- 

 plication mit der bewussten Ueberlegung die gewohnliche und 

 aussergewohnliche Handlung aus derselben Quelle stammen, dass 

 sie entweder beide wirklicher Instinct, oder beide Resultate bewuss- 

 ter Ueberlegung sind." — Philosophy of the Unconscious, 3d ed.,p. 76. 



